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JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-3-102(3)(a) this Court has appellate 
jurisdiction over a judgment of the Utah Court of Appeals. Further, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(5), the Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear this appeal 
in an order dated July 6, 2016. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding Petitioner's suit must be 
dismissed for failure to bring its subrogation action in the name of its insured. 
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same 
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous." 
State v. Harmon, 910 P. 2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995) ( citing Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P .2d 
97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992). 
Interpretation of statutes and decisional precedents are reviewed for correctness. 
See MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 2006 UT 25, il 9, 134 P.3d 1116 ("A matter 
of statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review on appeal for correctness." 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Adoption of A.F.K., 2009 
UT App 198, ,r 16, 216 P.3d 980 (explaining that "issues that require interpretation of 
prior decisional precedents" are "questions of law that are reviewed for correctness" 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
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Preservation in Record: This issue was preserved at numerous points before the 
trial court, including R. at 457-7 5; R. at 821. 1 This issue also arose when the Utah Court 
of Appeals rendered its decision on February 25, 2015. Petitioner requested certiorari to 
hear this issue on March 24, 2016. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 18-19. The statement of this 
issue is taken verbatim from this Courts' order granting certiorari on July 6, 2016. 
Issue 2: Whether Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provided an alternative 
to dismissal of Petitioner's complaint. 
Sta~dard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same 
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous." 
Harmon, 910 P. 2d at 1199. 
"[T]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law that we review for 
correctness." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ~ 15, 16 P.3d 540. 
Preservation in Record: This issue arose when the Utah Court of Appeals 
rendered its decision on February 25, 2015. Petitioner requested certiorari to hear this 
issue on March 24, 2016. Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 18-19. The statement of this issue is 
taken verbatim from this Courts' order granting certiorari on July 6, 2016. 
1 In this brief, the court record of pleadings and papers shall be referred to as "R. page. 
number." 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Annotated Section§ 31A-21-108: Subrogation actions 
Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its 
insured. 
RULES: 
Rule 17 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (in relevant part): 
(a) Real p~y in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute 
may sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit 
the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use 
or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No 
action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after 
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or 
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced 
in the name of the real party in interest. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant/Petitioner, Educators Mutual Insurance Association ("El\1IA"), appeals 
the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance Association, 
2016 UT App 38, 368 P.3d 471: A true and correct copy of said opinion is attached 
hereto and hereby incorporated as Addend. A. Appellees/Respondents in this matter are 
Everett P. Wilson Jr. and Darla Wilson ("Wilsons"). The nature of this appeal focuses on 
whether an insurer has the right to bring a subrogation action in its own name or if the 
3 
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insurer must bring the action in the name of the insured. This appeal focuses secondarily 
on the question of if an insurer must bring a subrogation action in the. name of the 
insured, but the insurer instead brings the action in its own name, is dismissal of the 
subrogation claim required, or does Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide an 
alternative to dismissal. 
Jessica Wilson, an insured of EMIA, was struck by a car while crossing the road 
and passed away shortly thereafter from her injuries. R. at 571. EMIA paid for Jessica 
Wilson's medical treatment. R. at 561. Jessica Wilson's parents filed a wrongful death 
claim against the driver for burial expenses and compensation for loss of their daughter's 
society, love, companionship, protection, and affection. R. at 570. EMIA filed a 
subrogation claim in its own name against the driver to recoup the expenses EMIA had 
paid for Jessica Wilson's medical treatment following the accident. R. at"771-75. EMIA 
and Wilsons' cases were consolidated. R. at 541. The liability insurance carrier for the 
tortfeasor interplead the driver's policy limit-$100,000-to be allocated by the district 
court, and EMIA and the Wilsons released their claims against the driver. R. at 543. The 
district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Regarding 
Allocation of lnterpleader Amount Deposited with the Court (attached as Addend. B), 
allocating $24,182.31 to EMIA, and $75,817.69 to the Wilsons. R. at 844. 
Course of Proceedings/Disposition in the Lower Courts 
EMIA filed a subrogation claim against the tortfeasor to recoup the expenses 
EMIA had paid for Jessica Wilson's medical treatment following the accident. R. at 771-
7 5. The tortfeasor moved to dismiss EMIA' s claim, challenging EWA' s standing to 
4 
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bring its suit. R. at 560-61. The district court entered an order (attached as Addend. C) 
denying the motion to dismiss, adjudging that EMIA had standing to bring an action for 
subrogation under Utah's Subrogation Statute, and to do so in its own name. R. at 821. 
EMIA and Wilsons' cases were consolidated. R. at 541. The liability insurance carrier 
interplead the driver's policy limit-$100,000-to be allocated by the court, and EMIA 
and the Wilsons released their claims against the driver. R. at 543. 
The district court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Regarding Allocation of lnterpleader Amount Deposited with the Court, allocating 
$24,182.31 to EMIA, and $75,817.69 to the Wilsons. R. at 844. The Wilsons filed a 
Notice of Appeal on February 27, 2015. R. at 759. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102( 4) the Utah Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals on or 
about March 19, 2015. R. at 763. 
After briefing and oral argument, the Utah Court of Appeals rendered its opi?ion 
on February 25, 2016. That opinion reversed the decision of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court on the basis that EMIA lacked standing to bring its subrogation claim against the 
tortfeasor in its own name, and remanded the matter with instructions that EMIA's claims 
be dismissed. Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, il 13, 368 P.3d 471. Because the Utah Court of 
Appeals determined that EWA lacked standing, the other issues pres~nted by the 
Wilsons on appeal were not addressed directly in its opinion. Id. at il 7. EMJA sought 
review of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision, filing its Petition for Writ of Certiorari on 
March 24, 2016. Certiorari was granted by the Utah Supreme Court in an order dated July 
6,2016. 
5 
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Statement of Facts 
On or about September 19, 2010, Jessica Wilson was walking in a crosswalk on 
the campus of Brigham Young University when she was struck by a car driven by Cade 
Krueger (the "tortfeasor"). R. at 571. Jessica Wilson was severely injured as a result and 
later passed away. Id. 
At all times relevant to this matter, Jessica Wilson was insured through EMIA for 
medical expenses. R. at 843. The medical policy contains provisions and terms governing 
EMIA' s right to reimbursement and subrogation. R. at 624-25. See generally R. at 605-
85 (setting forth full medical policy). As a result of the automobile accident caused by the 
tortfeasor, EMIA paid medical expenses on behalf of Jessica Wilson in the amount of 
$78,692.34. R. at 772. 
EMIA and the Wilsons filed separate claims against the tortf easor; EMIA sued for 
reimbursement, including interest, of the medical expenses it paid in behalf of Jessica 
Wilson that were incurred when the tortfeasor's vehicle struck her, and Wilsons sued the ~ 
tortfeasor for the wrongful death of Jessica Wilson. R. at 843. 
The tortfeasor filed a motion to dismiss EMIA's suit, arguing that EMIA lacked 
standing to bring its suit. R. at 560-61 The district court entered an order denying the 
motion to dismiss, adjudging that EMIA had standing to bring an action for subrogation 
under Utah's Subrogation Statute, and to do so in its own name. R. at 821. 
The claims filed by EMIA and the Wilsons were consolidated and the parties 
stipulated to release and dismiss the tortfeasor from the lawsuit upon the tortfeasor 
6 
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interpleading $100,000-the tortfeasor insurance liability policy limit-with the trial 
court. R. at 543, 841. 
Upon weighing the equities between Wilsons and EMIA, the trial court ordered 
that Wilsons receive $75,817.69 of the interpleaded funds, while EMIA received 
$24,182.31. R. at 840-44. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals erred in concluding that EMIA lacked standing to 
pursue a subrogation action in its own name and in concluding that neither Utah's 
subrogation statute nor Utah's case law grant in insurer the right to pursue a subrogation 
action in its own name. Utah case law going back to the tum of the twentieth century 
clearly holds that a subrogating insurer is a real party in interest in a subrogation 
proceeding and may maintain its subrogation action in its own name. No case or statute 
has altered this real party in interest rule, and insurers continue to bring subrogation 
actions in either their own name or the name of their insured. Until the court of appeals 
decision in this matter, no Utah appellate court has questioned the insurer's right to 
maintain a subrogation action in its own name in the last seventy years. 
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals relied heavily on the 1944 case, 
Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P .2d 98 (Utah 1944 ). This reliance on Johanson is 
misplaced primarily because the portions of Johanson quoted by the court of appeals 
were not the law the Johanson Court adopted; the Johanson Court first analyzed the 
different positions taken by other states (including the portions quoted by the court of 
appeals) before adopting a completely contrary position. 
7 
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The court of appeals ignores several policy implications including how its decision 
would alter what losses an insurer is willing to cover, how insurers will likely be required @ 
to raise insurance premiums, and how the court of appeals' decision would make it 
impossible for an insurer to recover in instances where an insured passes away from the 
actions or inactions of a tortfeasor. Also, while not central to the issues here on appeal, 
the court of appeals' opinion includes problematic dicta concerning an heirs' supposed 
superior right to reimbursement over an insurer when an insured passes away. This 
language, unless addressed, will likely cause confusion in future cases where insureds 
pass away from the actions or inactions of a tortfeasor. 
Finally, even if the court of appeals was correct that an insurer cannot bring a 
subrogation action in its own name, the court of appeals was incorrect to dismiss EMIA' s 
action. Rather, Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides an alternative to 
dismissal. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE ITS INTERPRETATION OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED§ 31A-21-108 WAS INCORRECT, AND THE DECISION WAS 
CONTRARY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 17 OF THE UT AH RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
As this Court has instructed, "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court. In doing so, this court adopts the same 
standard of review used by the court of appeals: questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous." 
State v. Harmon, 910 P. 2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). 
8 
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In this matter the decision· of the Utah Court of Appeals should be reversed 
primarily for two reasons: (1) the Utah Court nf Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann.§ 31A-21-108 was incorrect; and (2) even assuming that the Utah Court of Appeals' 
interpretation was correct, remanding the matter to the trial court with instructions to 
dismiss EMIA's claims was a violation of Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' INTERPRETATION OF§ 31A-21-108 
WAS INCORRECT. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 3 lA-21-108 provides "[s]ubrogation actions may be brought by 
the insurer in the name of its insured." The court of appeals held§ 31A-21-108 does not 
give EMIA standing to bring a subrogation action in its own name. See Wilson, 2016 UT 
App 3 8, 1 8, 12, 368 P .3d 4 71. Interpretation of statutes and decisional precedents are 
reviewed for correctness. MacFarlane, 2006 UT 25, 19, 134 P.3d 1116; In re Adoption 
of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, ,I 16,216 P.3d 980. 
In this matter, the court of appeals' construction of§ 31A-21-108 is untenable for 
several reasons and its decision should be reversed. First, the manner in which the court 
of appeals interpreted the permissive "may" in§ 31A-21-108 nullifies the effect of the 
statute because the right for an insurer to subrogate already exists at common law. 
Second, Utah case law illustrates that insurers regularly bring subrogation actions in their 
own names, and have before the enactment of§ 3 lA-21-108. Third, the court of appeals 
misapplied Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944). Fourth, the 
manner in which the court of appeals interpreted § 3 lA-21-108 would make it impossible 
for an insurer to subrogate against a tortfeasor if the insured dies as a result of a 
9 
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tortfeasor's negligence. Fifth, the court of appeals' interpretation of§ 31A-21-108 creates 
serious policy issues. Finally, the court of appeals cited incorrectly to case law to support ~ 
its proposition that heirs have a superior right of recovery. 
A. UNDER THE COURT OF APPEALS' REASONING, THERE WOULD 
HA VE BEEN NO NEED TO ENACT§ 31A-21-108. 
The manner in which the court of appeals construed §3 lA-21-108 nullifies the 
effect of the statute and makes it meaningless. The court of appeals examined the 
common law to determine whether an insurer may bring a subrogation action in its own 
name, stating, "a suit at law to enforce such right of subrogation must, at common law, be 
brought in the name of the insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name 
and right." Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, 110, 368 P.3d 471 (quoting Johanson, 152 P.2d at 
104). The court of appeals' reliance on Johansen is misplaced for reasons that will be 
discussed in Section I(C) of this Brief. However, if the common law already allowed an 
insurer to bring a subrogation action in the name of the insured, as the court of appeals 
asserts, then there would have been no reason for the legislature to enact §3 lA-21-108, as 
under the court of appeals' interpretation of the statue, its only effect is to allow insurers 
to bring a subrogation action in the name of an insured. 
B. A REVIEW OF UTAH'S SUBROGATION CASE LAW SHOWS THAT 
UNDER UT AH LAW THE SUBROGATING INSURER HAS LONG BEEN 
REGARDED AS A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST WITH A RIGHT TO 
BRING A SUBROGATION ACTION IN ITS OWN NAME. 
The Utah Court of Appeals stated, "Our review of Utah case law convinces us that 
... no independent right exists for an insurer to seek subrogated damages in its own 
name." Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, 18, 368 P.3d 471. On the contrary, a review of Utah 
10 
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case law shows that Utah has long recognized that the subrogating insurer is a real party 
in interest in a subrogation action and has the right to seek subrogated damages in its own 
name. 
In 1913, National Union Fire Insurance Co. brought an action against a defendant 
railroad company on behalf of its insured. Nat'/ Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R. G.R. 
Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P. 653, 653 (1913). The defendant argued that because National 
Union had not reimbursed the insured for the full amount of the damages suffered (the 
insured had not been made whole), the insured maintained an interest in the claim and the 
claim should have been brought by the insured. Id.. at 654. The Utah Supreme Court 
rejected this argument. Id. at 654-57. The supreme court noted that a subrogating insurer 
acts as an assignee and thus is a real party in interest with a right to bring an action in its 
own name, whether or not there is a formal assignment issued. See id. at 655-56. The 
Utah Supreme Court established this insurer as real party in interest rule reasoning that 
even if no formal assignment had been issued, an equitable assignment had still arisen. 
Id. The Utah Supreme Court explained: 
Not only does the [insurer as real party in interest] rule prevail when the 
assignment is absolute and complete and the assignee is the legal owner of 
the demand; it prevails with equal force in cases where the assignment is 
simply equitable in its character; and the assignee1s title would not have 
been recognized in any form by a court of law under the old system but 
would have been purely equitable. Such assig~ee, being the real party in 
interest, must bring the action in his own name. 
Id. Thus, even if the insurer "only obtained an equitable or a qualified interest as 
contradistinguished from an absolute and unqualified interest, still ... it was the real 
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party in interest~ so far its interest extended, and the action could be commenced and 
maintained in its name." Id. at 655. 
In the 193 8 case Baker v. Wycoff, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted then recent 
changes in Utah's worker's compensation statute to determine if a subrogating insurer 
has a legal right to maintain a subrogation action. 79 P .2d 77, 80 ( 193 8). The legislation 
interpreted in Baker stated that an "insurance carrier having paid the compensation shall 
be subrogated to the rights of such employee or his dependents to recover against such 
third person." Id. 80-81 (emphasis added). However, the statute did not explain how a 
subrogation action should be commenced, nor in whose name the action should be 
pursued. See id. The supreme court concluded that, while the injured employee originally 
had a valid cause of action, "[ a ]ny right of action he had [ was then] passed, under the 
statute, to the insurance carrier, who was by law subrogated to the rights of the 
workman." Id. at 81. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court held that a subrogating insurer is the 
real party in interest in a subrogation claim with ownership of the claim and a right to 
bring the claim in its own name. See id. 
The supreme court later revisited this ~ame subrogation statute in Johanson v. 
Cudahy Packing Co. to determine whether the insured, along with the subrogating 
insurer, is also a real party in interest. 152 P.2d 98 (1944).2 The supreme court seemed to 
agree with the proposition that if the insured has been made whole, the insured "would no 
longer have any interest in the cause of action," and the insurer would remain the sole 
2 Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. will be analyzed in much greater detail below in 
Section I(C) of this Brief. 
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party in interest. Id. at 103. However, if the insurer has not paid the full amount of the 
loss suffered, the injured insured retains an interest in the action. Id. at 104. Under such 
circumstances, both the insurer ("as equitable assignees of the insured," id. at 104) and 
the injured insured are "co-owners of the insured1s right of action." Id. at 104. 
As the twentieth century progressed, the Utah Supreme Court continually 
recognized a subrogating insurer's right to bring a subrogation action in its own name. In 
1969, the Supreme Court decided State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange, 450 P.2d 458 (1969). In State Farm, the subrogating insurer 
brought a subrogation claim, in its own name, to recover for medical expenses it had paid 
on behalf of its insured. See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 493 P.2d 
1002, 1002~03 ( 1972) (providing factual background for the 1969 case). The tortfeasor 
argued that under Utah law, insurers could not pursue personal injury subrogation claims. 
Id. The supreme court dismissed this argument, allowing insurers to bring personal injury 
subrogation claims in the insurer's name. State Farm, 450 P.2d at 459. 
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes, Transamerica's insured was involved in 
a car accident where a passenger in the insured's car was injured. 505 P.2d 783 (Utah 
1972). Based on the insurance policy, Transamerica paid monies on behalf of the injured 
passenger. Transamerica notified the tortfeasor of its subrogation rights, but the tortfeasor 
sought to bypass the insurance company by settling with the injured party. Transamerica 
brought a subrogation action in its own name to enforce its subrogation rights. While 
Transamerica did not prevail, the Utah Supreme Court did not question whether or not 
Transamerica had standing to bring the subrogation action in its own name. 
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In Educators Mutual Insurance Association v. Allied Property & Casualty 
Insurance Co., Educators Mutual improperly pursued its subrogation rights through a 
fraud cause of action. 890 P .2d 1029 (Utah 1995). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
dismissing Educators Mutual' s case based on fraud, noting that Educators Mutual should 
have pursued its rights through a subrogation action, _noting "It is well settled that an 
insurer may bring a cause of action on behalf of its insured." Id. at I 031. The Educators 
Mutual Court then cited to both State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969)-a case where the insurance company brought its 
subrogation claim in its own name, not the name of its insured-and Utah Code Ann. § 
3 lA-21-108 ("Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer in the name of its 
insured."). Educators Mutual, 890 P .2d at 1031. The Utah Supreme Court did not 
indicate that the insurer had run afoul of either the real party in interest rule or standing 
rule by bringing the claim in its own name. 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Northwestern National 
Insurance Co., State Farm brought a subrogation action in its own name to recoup monies 
State Farm paid after its insured was involved in an automobile accident. 912 P.2d 983 
(Utah 1996). The Utah Supreme Court explained, "Utah law clearly recognizes an 
insurer's right to bring a subrogation action on behalf of its insured against a tortfeasor [ or 
the] insurance company which is primarily liable to ... pay any claims on behalf of its 
insured." Id. at 985 (citing Utah Code Ann.§ 3 lA-21-108). The Utah Supreme Court 
never questioned whether State Farm· was the real party in interest with standing to bring 
the action in its own name. 
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Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. involved multiple insurance 
companies and the liability of each to defend and pay for environmental clean-up of an 
industrial site. 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997). Aetna cross-claimed in its own name against 
AMICO and Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, seeking subrogation and 
contribution for the defense costs it had paid. Id. at 131. Even though "an insurer's 
subrogation right is derivative of the rights of its insured," id., the Utah Supreme Court 
did not require Aetna to seek subrogation in the name of its insured. Rather, the Court 
held that "Aetna has a valid cause of action for ... subrogation." Id. at 142. 
Finally, consider the district court matter of AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot 
Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015). (A copy of the 
docket and complaint for that matter are included as Addend. D). In that matter numerous 
insurers sued in their own names when assert~ng their subrogation rights, clearly showing 
that both insurers and the courts have long interpreted Utah law as allowing an insurance 
company to bring a subrogation action in either the name of the insurance company or the 
name of their insured. 
Under Utah law, a subrogating insurer is, and has long been, a real party in interest 
in a subrogation claim. As "the real party in interest ... the action could be commenced 
and maintained in its name." Nat'! Union, 137 P. at 655. As Utah subrogation law 
evolved, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the insured could also be a real party in 
interest, or "co-owner" of the claim. See Johanson, 152 P .2d at 104. However, no case or 
statute has altered the long-standing rule that a subrogating insurer is a real party in 
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interest in a subrogation claim with the right to bring a subrogation action in its own 
name. @ 
C. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED JOHANSON V. 
CUDAHY. 
The Utah Court of Appeals relies primarily on the 1944 case, Johanson v. Cudahy 
Packing Co., 152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944), to support its proposition that EMIA cannot bring 
a subrog_ation action in its own name. See Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, ilil 8-11, 368 P.3d 
4 71. Specifically, the court of appeals relies on the following language from Johanson: 
'"it has been generally held that a suit at law to enforce a right of subrogation must, at 
common law, be brought in the name of the insured, rather than by the insurance 
company in its own name and right."' Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, il 10, 368 P.3d 471 
( quoting Johanson, 152 P .2d at 104 ). This reliance on Johanson is misplaced primarily 
because the portion of Johanson quoted by the court of appeals is not the law the 
Johanson Court adopted; specifically, the Johanson Court first analyzed the different 
positions taken by other states (including the position quoted by the court of appeals) 
before adopting the completely contrary position that, under Utah law, both the insurer 
and insured are real parties in interest and both may bring the cause of action in their own 
name. Johanson, 152 P .2d at 104-105. 
Because the Johanson decision is so important to the court of appeal's decision in 
this matter, this Brief will address in depth the analysis and holding of Johanson v. 
C?,Ldahy Packing Company. This Brief will then individually address each instance in . 
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which the court of appeals relied on Johanson. Finally, this Brief will show how the 
holding of Johanson supports EMIA' s position. 
1. Analysis and Holding of Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. 
Johanson is a demurrer case in which the court was required to determine the 
parties' rights to bring a wrongful death cause of action in accordance with Utah's 1933 
worker's compensation subrogation statute. Already established and accepted by the 
Johanson Court was the Utah rule that the subrogating insurer is a real party in interest 
with right to bring the claim in its own name. Id. at 100, 103-05. The primary question 
before the Johanson Court was whether the subrogating insurer is the sole party in 
interest or if the injured insured also retained a right to the claim and was also a party in 
interest. Id. 
The factual background to Johanson is as follows. Robert Johanson died in an 
industrial accident in 193 8. Id. at 100. His parents applied for and were awarded 
industrial compensation for the death of their son in accordance with Utah's worker's 
compensation statute. Id. While the insurance carrier who paid the award could have 
brought a subrogation action against defendants in its own name, the insurer waived its 
right to bring the action. Id. at 104. Johanson's parents then brought a wrongful death 
cause of action themselves in their own names. Id. The defendant tortfeasor argued that, 
because the parents received a compensation award from the insurer, the insurer was the 
sole party in interest and the J ohansons "are not the proper parties to bring this action." 
Id. at 102. Defendants argued that only the subrogating insurer who had paid the award 
could bring the claim. Id. 
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At the time of the Johanson decision, there were three primary views the different 
states had adopted concerning in whose name a subrogation action should be brought. See <&; 
Michael C. Ferguson, The Real Party in Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing 
Defendant's Interest in the Determination of Proper Parties Plaintiff, 55 CAL. L. REV. 
1452, 14 79-80 ( 1967), http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
2841 &context=califomialawreview. The first view was that "actions on subrogated 
claims must be prosecuted by the subrogee [insurer] alone." Id. The second view was that 
"such actions [must] be prosecuted by the subrogor [insured] alone." Id. at 1480. The 
final view was that "either the subrogor or the subrogee [may] prosecute such actions." 
Id. In analyzing the issue of whether or not an injured insured is a real party in interest, 
the Johanson Court reviewed other jurisdictions' rulings to see how other states had 
addressed this issue, Johanson, 152 P .2d at 102-05, and the Johanson Court examined all 
three of the above views. Id. 
The first view, that the subrogee/insurer alone was the real party in interest, was 
embraced by Justice McDonough in the dissenting opinion. Id. at 110-111 (J. 
McDonough, dissenting). Justice McDonough opined that an insurer's subrogation rights 
result in "giving control of the cause of action [ to the] insurance carrier. It results in the 
... insurance carrier becoming the real party in interest .... The election by the 
employee [ to accept compensation from the insurer] divests him of any legal interest in 
the cause of action." Id. at 110 (J. McDonough, dissenting). The Johanson Court did not 
adopt this view. 
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The second view, that the subrogor/insured was the sole party in interest, was 
analyzed but not adopted in the majority opinion. Id. at 103-04. The Johanson Court 
noted that cases from several states support this rule. Id. at 103. 
These cases proceed upon the theory that the insured is the trustee for the 
insurer and that the ·third party has a right not to have the cause of action 
against him split up so that he is compelled to defend two or more actions. 
This splitting of the cause of action is avoided by having the suit brought in 
the name of the insured for the benefit of himself and as trustee for the 
insurance carrier. 
Id. at 103-04. Under this rule, the Johanson Court noted "it has been generally held that a 
suit at law to enforce such right of subrogation must, at common law, be brought in the 
name of the insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name and right." Id. 
at 104. While this view was contrary to Utah's precedence (that a subrogating insurer is 
the real party in interest in a subrogation claim, see Baker v. Wycoff, 79 P .2d 77, 81 (Utah 
1938); Nat'! Union, 137 P. at 655), analysis of this view supported the Johanson Court's 
final holding that the insured should maintain at least some rights to the cause of action. 
The view adopted by the Johanson Court was that both the subrogor and the 
subrogee are real parties in interest. Johanson, P.2d at 105. This view was analyzed at 
Johanson, 152 P .2d at 104-105. The Johanson Court began this line of analysis stating, 
."There are cases holding that under statutes similar to Utah statutes relating to proper and 
necessary parties plaintiff both the insured and the insurance carrier must be joined." Id. 
at 104. ln support of this view, the Johanson Court stated, "insurers which, by 
subrogation, are equitable assignees ... not only are proper parties plaintiff, but must be 
joined as such." Id. at 104 (quoting 96 A.L.R. 884-89). Under the view adopted by the 
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Johanson Court, both the insured and insurer were "co-owners of the insured' s right of 
action." Id. at 104. 
In applying this view to the facts of the case, the Johanson Court held, "When the 
insurance carrier declined to bring its action and executed a waiver thereof, the 
dependents were not compelled to forego suit. They have an interest in the recovery and 
can bring suit to enforce it." Id. at 104. The supreme court continued, 'The failure on the 
part of the plaintiffs to make the [missing party] a party plaintiff, or if it refused to join, 
make it a party defendant, is at the most a defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is 
waived unless raised." Id. at 104-05. The rule adopted by the Johanson Court is that both 
the insurer and insured are real parties in interest. Id. Both parties should be joined as 
parties plaintiff. Id. If one of the parties is not joined, "the defendant, by making timely 
objection, could have had the [missing party] made a party." Id. at 107. Failure to join the 
missing party is a defect that, unless raised, is waived. Id. at 104-05. 
2. The Court of Appeals Misapplied Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. 
The court of appeals misapplied the ruling in Johanson. It took one view analyzed 
by the Johanson Court and incorrectly applied that view as Utah law. This mistake is 
completely at odds with the actual holding in Johanson, is inconsistent with the 
development of Utah's subrogation law prior to Johanson, and ignores the development 
of subrogation case law subsequent to Johanson. See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) (allowing insurer to bring subrogation claim 
in own name); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nw. Nat Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 
1996) (same); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783 (Utah 1972) (same); State 
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Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 1969) (same); Nat'l 
@ 
Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 377 P.2d 786 (Utah 1963) 
(same). 
The court of appeals' primary application of Johanson was to cite Johanson's 
analysis of the subrogor/insured as sole party in interest view, a view not adopted by the 
Johanson Court. Under this rejected view, '"it has been generally held that a suit at law to 
enforce a right of subrogation must, at common law, be brought in the name of the 
insured, rather than by the insurance company in its own name and right."' Wilson, 2016 
UT App 38, ,r 10, 368 P.3d 471 (quoting Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104). However, the 
Johanson Court rejected this view. Instead, the Johanson Court adopted the view that 
both the insurer and insured are real parties in interest, both are co-owners of the claim, 
and both may bring the action in their own name. Johanson, 152 P .2d at 104-105. 
The court of appeals cited Johanson for the policy concern that allowing "an 
insurer to sue in its own name, except where it has fully indemnified the insured, could 
compel the wrongdoer to 'defend a multitude of suits' against multiple insurance 
companies, the insured, and/or the insured's dependents or heirs." Wilson, 2016 UT App 
38, ,r,r 10, 12 n.6, 368 PJd 471 (citing Johanson, 152 P.2d at 103). However, the 
Johanson Court addressed how this concern is resolved under the rule adopted by Utah. 
Specifically, the Johanson Court concluded that under the Utah rule (both insured and 
insurer are real parties in interest), the multiple suits problem is solved throughjoinder. 
There is but a single cause of action involved .... That the in~urers as 
equitable assignees of the insured are interested therein to the extent of their 
payment to the insured ... does not create other causes of action, legal or 
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equitable, against defendants. It is still one cause of action, a single 
controversy, owned in common by the insured and the insurers .... The 
plaintiffs herein, co-owners of the insured's right of action, were not only 
authorized by the state law to sue jointly as they did, but were compelled to 
do so. One compelled to join and joined in an action, and having a 
substantial interest therin, is not a nominal, but a necessary or indispensable 
party. 
Id. at 104. The supreme court explained how joinder protects a defendant against multiple 
suits. "The one and only interest of [ defendant] is that the suit be brought in the names of 
those interested in it so that he will not later be made to defend a second suit for the same 
wrong." Id. at 107. The supreme court explained that this "protection [against multiple 
suits] is insured here by the fact that the defendant, by making timely objection, could 
have had the [missing party] made a party." Id. at 107. Should the missing party-not be 
joined, that "is at the most a defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is waived unless 
raised." Id. at 105. The multiple suits problem highlighted by the court of appeals is 
solved, under Utah law, through joinder. 
Finally, the court of appeals notes that in workers' compensation cases such as 
Johanson, the legislature has granted explicit rights to the subrogating insurer, including 
"expressly grant[ing] insurers ... the authority to bring such actions in their own names," 
Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, il 8 n.4, 368 P.3d 471, and "expressly provid[ing] that the 
insurer is to be reimbursed before the employee or the employee's heirs." Id. ,I 11 n.5. 
While both of these rights do appear in current day statutes, neither right was expressly 
granted in the 1933 version of the statute interpreted by the Johanson Court. Rather, the 
Johanson Court relied on "general principles of subrogation as affected by statutes 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
governing pleading"-rather than express statutory language-in holding that both the 
insurer and insured are real parties in inter~st. Johanson, 152 P'.2d at 104 ("when ... no 
special rules for maintaining the [subrogation] action are prescribed, the proceeding to 
enforce the rights gained by subrogation will be controlled by general principles of 
subrogation as affected by statutes governing pleading."). 
3. The Holding of Johanson Supports EMIA's Position. 
Under Johanson's holding, both EMIA and Jessica Wilson (or Ms. Wilson's 
estate) are real parties in interest in this suit. Either may maintain the action in their own 
name. To protect himself from multiple sui~s, the defendant could have had Ms. Wilson's 
estate made a party to the proceedings. However, no party sought to have Ms. Wilson's 
estate joined in these proceedings. Failure to join Ms. Wilson's estate "is at the most a 
defect in parties plaintiff. Such a defect is waived unless raised." Johanson, 152 P.2d at 
105. It is important to note that the parties at the trial court level did consolidate the 
wrongful death proceeding with the subrogation proceeding. As such, consolidation 
provided the defendant with protection from multiple suits in this matter. 
The court of appeals misapplied Johanson by relying on language that the 
Johanson Court did not adopt as Utah law. The actual holding of Johanson, that both the 
insurer and insured are real parties in interest and both may bring the cause of action in 
their own name, Johanson; 152 P.2d at 104-105, supports EMIA's position. EMIA is a 
real party in interest and may maintain a subrogation action in its own name. 
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D. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS CREATED A REQUIREMENT THAT 
WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR AN INSURER TO RECOVER IN 
INSTANCES WHERE AN INSURED PASSES AWAY FROM THE 
ACTIONS OR INACTIONS OF A TORTFEASOR. 
Near the conclusion of its opinion, the court of appeals stated, "EMIA should have 
qrought its personal injury action in the name of the estate .... " Wilson, 2016 UT App 
38,112,368 P.3d 471. However, such a requirement ignores§ 31A-21-108 and Utah 
case law which allows an insurer to bring a subrogation action in its own name, and is 
untenable for two reasons. First, it creates a situation where an insurer would have to 
initiate a probate proceeding and hope for the assistance of a personal representative who 
would likely be unwilling to aid the insurer in its efforts to receive reimbursement; and 
second, the requirement runs contrary to rules of statutory interpretation. 
First, by requiring an insurer to bring an action in the name of the estate of its 
insured, the court of appeals has created a situation where an insurer will likely never be 
able to recover if its insured passes away as a result of injuries sustained by the actions or 
inactions of a third party. Utah code states in regard to survival actions 
A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or death caused 
by the wrongful act or negligence of a wrongdoer, does not abate upon the 
death of the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured person, or the 
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died, has a cause of 
action against the wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the 
wrongdoer. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107 (emphasis added). Given the l~guage of§ 78B-3-107, 
which only allows a survival action to be brought by the injured person, personal 
representative, or heirs of the deceased, and the court of appeals' reasoning, an insurer 
would be required to initiate a probate proceeding and pursue its claims with the 
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assistance of a personal representative who would likely be a family member of the 
deceased. If the present matter illustrates anything it is that the interests of the family of a 
deceased individual and that of the insurer are often conflicted. A personal representative 
or family member would have little incentive to assist an insurer if doing so would 
potentially reduce the amount of assets or funds available for the person acting as 
personal representative, or other family members, to receive. Creating such a requirement 
was unnecessary given § 3 lA-21-108 allows an insurer to bring a subrogation action in 
its own name. 
Second, requiring an insurer to sue in the name of the estate of its insured runs 
contrary to normal rules of statutory interpretation. The Utah Supreme Court has stated in 
regard to statutory interpretation, there is a "general rule that [the court] should construe 
statutory provisions so as to give full effect to all their terms, where possible." Schurtz v. 
BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 1991). Further, "[w]hen 
interpreting statutes, we look first to the statute's plain language with the primary 
objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 
2007 UT 42, 146, 164 P.3d 384. Also, "'[w]e presume that the legislature used each 
word advisedly' and read 'each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning."' 
Id. (quoting State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88,129, 127 P.3d 682). Finally, "[s]tatutes should 
be read as a whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony with related provisions 
and statutes." Martinez, 2007 UT 42, 146, 164 P.3d 384. The approach utilized by the 
court of appeals ignores Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-21-108, and allows § 78B-3-107 to 
nullify, or swallow,§ 3 lA-21-108. Such an approach runs contrary to the requirement 
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that "[ s ]tatutes should be read as a whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony 
with related provisions and statutes." Martinez, 2007 UT 42, 146, 164 P.3d 384. 
Another approach, which would have given full effect to§ 3 lA-21-108 and§ 78B-3-107, 
would have been to allow an insurer to recover those damages pertaining to its 
subrogation claim, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-21-108, while allowing heirs to 
recover those damages available pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107, as the 
damages that each respective party would be entitled to differ. 
E. THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED POLICY IMPLICATIONS. 
The court of appeals has also failed to consider serious policy implications. First, 
as was noted above, it is unlikely insurers will receive reimbursement if an insured passes 
away because of the actions or inactions of a third-party tortfeasor if an insurer cannot 
bring a subrogation action in its own name. In order to protect their interests, insurers will 
likely add language to their policies excluding coverage for injuries sustained by an 
insured that were caused by a third-party, if the insured subsequently passes away as a 
result of the injuries sustained. This would inappropriately shift the financial burden from 
the tortfeasor to the family of the insured and/or medical providers. Simply put, the Utah 
Court of Appeals' opinion disincentivizes insurers providing coverage for most 
catastrophic accidents. 
Second, even if insurers do not add exclusionary language to their policies, it is 
likely that insurance premiums will increase substantially. When actuaries for insurance 
companies determine premiums for insurance policies they generally take into account 
the right of the insurer to subrogate against a tortf easor who has caused the injuries of its 
26 
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insured. If an insurer is effectively barred from maintaining a subrogation action because 
the insured has died as a result of the injuries sustained, premium rates would increase 
since there would be no hope for reimbursement. This is unfair to insureds who would be 
forced to bear the burden of increased premiums. 
Finally, there are instances where it makes good sense procedurally to allow 
insurers to bring subrogation actions in their own names. This is especially true in multi-
party actions. In those cases there may be multiple insurers seeking subrogation, and 
Plaintiffs seeking redress for tort claims. All of the parties would potentially be suing 
under the same name. For example, in matters like AGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot 
Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015), where there are 
several parties involved, forcing the insurers to sue in the names of their insureds creates 
confusion and an organizational nightmare for the district court. All of which is avoided 
by simply allowing insurers to bring their subrogation actions in their _own names. 
F. HILL AND CEDERLOFFDO NOT STAND FOR THE PROPOSITION 
THAT AN HEIR HAS A SUPERIOR RIGHT TO RECOVER IN A 
PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM. 
In footnote 6 of its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals states 
EMIA asserts that the correct approach would be to allow the insurer and 
the heirs to pursue separate claims to recover their respective shares of 
damages arising from a personal injury claim. Such an approach would ... 
potentially compromise the heirs' superior right to recover their share of 
the personal injury claim, see Hill [v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 
P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988)]. See Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P.2d 777, 780 
(Utah 1946). 
Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, 112 n.6, 368 P.3d 471 (emphasis added). However, neither 
Hill nor Ceder/off stand for the proposition that heirs have a superior right of recovery. 
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The portion of Hill cited to by the Utah Court of Appeals provides a factual 
background; the general principle that "Subrogation is an equitable doctrine .... [which] 
can be modified by contract"; and the obstacles associated with determining whether or 
not an insured has been made whole by a settlement when equitable subrogation 
principles apply rather than contractual principles. 765 P.2d at 866.3 Hill simply does not 
state that heirs have a superior right to recovery. 
In regard to Ceder/off, that matter did not deal with wrongful death heirs, nor did it 
address the issue of priority of recovery between heirs and a subrogated insurer. Instead, 
the Utah Supreme Court considered whether or not an insured who had received 
insurance proceeds could maintain an action in the insured' s name for amounts that had 
been paid by the insurer in behalf of the insured. Ceder/off, 169 P.2d at 777-78. 
Therefore, similar to Hill, Ceder/off does not stand for the proposition that heirs have a 
superior right to recovery over an insurer. 
II. THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED RULE 17 OF THE UT AH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE INCORRECTLY. 
Even if the Utah Court of Appeals correctly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-
21-108, it misapplied Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 17 states 
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed 
after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder 
or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
3 It should be noted that EMIA was subrogating in accordance with the contractual terms 
contained in its insurance policy with Jessica Wilson. As such, much of the doctrine 
contained in Hill is inapplicable as the Hill Court applied equitable principles of 
subrogation in that matter. See Hill, 765 P.2d at 867. 
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vJ. 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced 
in the name of the real party in interest. 
U.R.C.P. 17(a). (emphasis added). 
Despite the clear language in Rule 17, in its opinion, the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated, "We conclude that Elv1IA lacked standing to pursue a subrogation action against 
Krueger in its own name. Thus, the trial court em.~d in dividing the Wilsons' settlement 
with EMIA. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand with instructions 
for the trial court to dismiss EMIA 's claims .... " Wilson, 2016 UT App 38, 113, 368 
P.3d 471. (emphasis added). EMIA's ability to bring a subrogation action in its own 
name is not a standing issue, rather a real party in interest issue governed by Rule 17, 
making dismissal inappropriate. While EMIA believes that it was proper to bring its 
subrogation action in its own name, even if it could not, Elv1IA would have had standing 
had it brought its subrogation action in the name of its insured. See Wilson, 2016 UT App 
38, 112, 368 P.3d 471 ("EMIA should have brought its personal injury action in tl~e 
name of the estate or intervened in the Wilsons' action against Krueger."). Therefore, 
pursuant to Rule 17, the Utah Court of Appeals should not have ordered that EMIA's 
claims be dismissed. 
The problem with this remedy is illustrated inAGCS Marine Ins. Co. v. Adler Hot 
Oil Serv. Inc., No. 150800020 (Utah 8th Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 26, 2015). In that matter 
several insurers sued in their own names when asserting their subrogation rights. Shortly 
after the Wilson opinion was entered, the insurers in that matter immediately filed 
motions to change the named party in interest to their insureds. However, the holding of 
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Wilson may not allow for that change, but may require dismissal of the subrogating 
insurers' actions. Such a result is unfair and inappropriate pursuant to Rule 17. 
Because EMIA's ability to bring a subrogation action in its own name is not a 
standing issue, rather a real party in interest issue governed by Rule 17, dismissal was 
inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Because EMIA had standing to bring its action in its own name, the decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals should be reversed. Further, even if§ 3 lA-21-108 does not give 
EMIA standing to bring an action in its own name, the court of appeals' decision 
requiring the trial court to dismiss EMIA' s action should be reversed as it is contrary to 
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SENIOR JUDGE p AMELA T. GREENWOOD authored this Opinion, in 
which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and KATE A. TOOMEY 
concurred. 1 
GREENWOOD, Senior Judge: 
<ftl Everett P. Wilson Jr. and Darla Wilson appeal the trial 
court's order awarding a portion of interpleaded funds to 
Educators Mutual Insurance Association (EMIA). We reverse 
and remand. 
1. Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat by special assignment 
as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Adm:in. 11~ 
201(6). 
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Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance 
BACKGROUND 
12 On September 19, 2010, the Wilsons' daughter, Jessica, 
was kHled after having been struck by a vehicle drivert by Cade 
Krueger. EMIA, Jessica's insurer, pajd nearly $79,000 in medical 
expenses on her behalf. No personal representative was sought 
or appointed for Jessica's estate. 
5(3 The Wilsons filed a wrongful death claim against Krueger 
on January 12, 2011, seekin.g damages for the loss, love, and 
affection of their daughter and for funeral expenses. After 
several years of discovery and litigation, the Wilsons reached a 
tentative settlement with Krueger's insurer for the $100,000 limit 
on his insurance poµ.cy. 
<_[4 On January 22, 2014, EMIA filed a "Complaint for 
Subrogation Claim" against Krueger, seeking reimbursement for 
medical expenses it had paid on Jessica's behalf, with accrued 
interest.2 EMIA asserted its subrogation cla:i.ni pursuant to the 
terms of its insurance contract with Jessica. All par?es agreed to 
consolidate the cases, and Krueger filed an interpleader 
counterclaim against both the Wilsons and EMIA, in which his 
insurer agre.ed to interplead the $100,000 policy limit with the 
court. EMIA and the Wilsons agreed to accept·the $100,000 in 
settlement of their claims against Krueger but disagreed as to 
how the funds should be distributed. EMIA and the Wilsons 
agreed to dismiss Krueger from the lawsuit with prejudice. The 
trial court ordered Krueger's insurer to deposit the $100,000 with 
the court and gav~ the parties the opportunity to file briefs in 
support of their competing claims to the funds. 
2. EMIA had :initially asserted a lien against the yVilsons' 
wrongful death claim but later acknowledged that it could not 
assert such a lien "against payments to the heirs of a deceased on 
a wrongful death claim." 
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Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance 
<]IS The Wilsons asserted that they were entitled to the entire 
· $100,000 settlement. They raised a number of arguments in 
support of this position, including that they have u superior 
equity" over a subrogated insurer and are therefore entitled to 
be "made whole'~ before the insurer is paid, tI:at EMIA had no 
legal right to pursue a cause of action against Krueger in its own 
name, and that EMIA' s action was barred by a three-year statute 
of limitations. 
<][6 The trial court ultimately rejected the Wilsons' arguments 
and divided the settlement money equally between the Wilsons 
and EMIA after finding that each party had incurred damages m 
excess of $100,000. However, in acknowledgment that the 
Wilsons' efforts to obtain the settlement had been 
disproportionate to those of EMIA, the trial court determined 
that the Wilsons were entitled to $25,817.69 of EMIA' s award to 
reimburse them for• a portion of their attorney fees. Accordingly, 
the trial court awarded $75,817.69 to the Wilsons and $24,182.31 
to EMIA: The Wilsons now appeal. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
17 The Wilsons raise a number of ar~m~nts in support of 
their assertion that the trial court erred in awarding EMIA a 
portion of the settlement. Because we agree with the Wilsons 
that EMIA lacked standing to brmg a subrogation action in its 
own name rather than m the name of Jessica or Jessica's estate, 
we do not address the Wilsons' other arguments. As this 
question involves the mterpretation of a statute, as well as 
decisional precedents, we review the trial court's ruling for 
correctness. See MacFarlane v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2006 UT 25, 
'i[ 9, 134 P.3d 1116 (" A matter of statutory interpretation [is] a 
question of. law that we review on appeal for correctness." 
(alteration in orig:inal) (citation ~d internal quotation marks 
omitted)); In re Adoption of A.F.K., 2009 UT App 198, <][· 16, 216 
P.3d 980 (explaining that "issues that require interpretation of 
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Wilson v. Educators Mutital Insurance 
prior. decisional precedents" are "questions of law that are 
reviewed for correctness" ( citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
ANALYSIS 
18 Utah's ~ubrogation statute provides, "Subrogation actions 
may be brought by the insurer in the name of its insured." Utah 
Code Ann.§ 31A-21-108 (LexisNexis 2014). EMIA asserts that the 
use of the word "may" impli<:s that the insurer may bring the 
action in the name of the insured but is not required to do so and 
may instead choose to bring the action in its own name. See State 
v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]he term 
'may' is generally construed to be permissive and not mandatory 
.... " (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We 
assume, without deciding, that the statute's use of the 
permissive "may" allows for the possibility that bringing an 
action in the name of the insured is not the exclusive manner for · 
an insurer to pursue a subrogation claim.3 Nevertheless, the 
3. Though we assume for purposes of our analysis that the 
permissive "may" applies to the manner in whlch the insurer 
brings the action, i.e., in its own name or in the name of another, 
we recognize that the legislature may have intended the word 
"may" to grant the insurer discretion only as to whether to bring 
the action at all. Cf Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT App 297, 
<j{<jf 23-24, 243 P.3d 500 (rejecting the assertion that language 
providing t~at "[a] final action or order of [ a municipal 
employee] appeal board may be appealed to the Court of 
Appeals" could be interpreted as permitting a party to appeal in 
another venue, explaining that the language "is not permissive 
in the sense that the employee may seek review in the court of 
appeals if he likes but may complain in some other judicial 
venue if he prefers" but that, "[o]n the contrary, the statute is 
(continued ... ) 
20150150-CA 4 2016 UT App 38 
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Wilson v. Educators Mutual-Insurance 
statute contains no language granting an insurance company the 
right to bring a subrogation action in its own name. 4 So even 
assuming that bringmg an action in the name of the insured is 
110€, statutorily, the exclusive method for· br:inging suit, there 
must be some legal basis, apart from the statute as currently 
written, authorizing the insurer to bring the action in its own 
name. Cf Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525, 528 (Utah 1976) 
(providing that permissive language in a statute "does not 
foreclose the right of a person" to pursue a remedy ''by any 
other means provided by law" (emphasis added)). Our review of 
Utah case law convinces us that, with the possible exception of. 
an insurer who has fully· indemnified the · insured for all 
damages for which the wrongdoer could be held liable, see 
Johanson v. Cudahy [:acking Co., 152 P.2d 98, 103 (Utah 1944), no 
( ... continued) 
clear that the only cow;t to which the employee may seek initial 
recourse ... is the Utah Court of Appeals" (first alteration in 
original)) .. . 
4. Conversely, the legislature has expressly granted insurers 
seeking reimbursement for the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits the authority to bring such actions in their 
own names: 
If compensation is claimed and the employer or 
:insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay 
compensation, the employer or insurance carrier: 
(i) shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party; and 
(ii) may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or :in. the name of the injured employee, 
or the employee's heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(2)(a) ·(LexisNexis 2011) (emphasis 
added). 
20150150-CA 5 2016 UT App 38 
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Wilson v. Educators Mutual Insurance 
independent right exists for an insurer to seek subrogated 
damages~ its own name. 
19 First, EWA does not have a direct cause of action against 
Krueger. "An insurer's subrogation right to recover from a 
responsible third party the amount the insurer paid to or on 
behalf of its insured derives from the insurance contract between 
the insurer and the insured," and its causes of action against that 
third party are limited "to those rights or causes of action that 
the insured possesses against the third party." Bakowski v. 
Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62, <_[ 23, 52 P.3d 1179. "[E]ven 
though the insurance company is subrogated to a part of the 
claim of the plaintiff, against the defendant, that does not create 
another cause of action and there can only be one suit to recover 
on that cause of action." Cederloff v. Whited, 169 P.2d 777, 780 
(Utah 1946). 
<_[10 Further, "it has been generally held that a suit at law to 
enforce [ a] right of subrogation must, at common law, be 
brought in the name of the insured, rather than_ by the insurance 
company in its own name and right." Johanson, 152 P.2d at 104 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Utah R. 
Civ. P. 17(a) ("Every action shall be prosecuted :in the name of 
the real party in interest. ... [A] party authorized by statute may 
sue in that person's name .... "). "The reason for the rule is that 
the wrongful act" of the third party being sued "is single and 
indivisible, and gives r_ise to but one liability." Johanson, 152 P.2d 
at 103. Permitting an insurer to sue in its own name, except 
where it has fully :indemnified the insured, could compel the 
wrongdoer to "defend a multitude of suits" against multiple 
insurance · companies, the insured, and/or the insured' s 
dependents or heirs. Id. 
<_I[l 1 Furthermore, "[ c ]onsiderations of reason and policy impel 
the conclusion that the plain.tiff, the o~e who has suffered the 
injury and damage, should have basic ownership and control of 
20150150-CA 6 2016 UT App 38 
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his cause of action." Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1973). 
Even under statutory schemes that give the insurance carrier's 
right to reimbursement priority over the injured party's right to 
damages,5 our supreme court has concluded "that the rights 
conferred upon the insurance carrier" to pursue an action 
against a third . party "should be regarded as secondary to the 
plaintiff's interest" in controlling the cause of action. Id. Thus, at 
least where the insured or the insured's estate retains some 
interest in the potential damages, an insurance company cannot 
pursue a subrogation action in its own name. 
1(12 After Jessica's death, her cause of action for personal 
injury passed to her estate by· virtue of Utah's survival statute. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-107(1)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015) 
("A cause of action arising out of personal injury to a person, or 
death caused by the wrongful act or negligence of a wrongdoer, 
does not abate upon the death of the ... injured person .... [T]he 
personal representatives or heirs ·of the person who died, ··[have] 
a cause of action against the wrongdoer .... ").. The survival 
statute grants the personal representatives or heirs of the injured 
decedent the right to pursue both "special and general damages" 
5. In subrogation actions ·where the insurer has paid workers' 
compensation benefits, such as in Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 
152 P.2d 98 (Utah 1944), and Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 
1973), the Workers' Compensation Act expressly provides that 
the insurer is to be reimbursed before the employee or the 
employee's heirs. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(5); see also 
Anderson v. United Parcel Serv., 2004 UT 57, <j[<j[ 8-13, 96 P.3d 903. 
But in a case such as this, where the expenses paid by the insurer 
were not connected to a workers' compensation claim, "in the 
abser:ice of express terms to the contrary, the insured must be 
made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from 
a recovery from the third-party tort-feasor." Hill v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864, 866 (Utah 1988). 
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· agamst the wrongdoer. Id. General damages include damages 
for the insured' s pain and suffering, Balderas v. Starks, 2006 UT 
App 218,, <Jl 16 n.5, 138 P.3d 75, which would have been separate 
from the medical expenses paid by E1-1IA on Jessica's behalf. 
Since Je~sica' s estate would presumably have b~en entitled to at 
least some· portion of the damages recoverable in a personal 
injury action, EMIA should have brought its personal injury 
action in the name of the estate or intervened in the Wilsons1 
action against Krueger. 6 Instead,, it filed an action in its own 
name, which Utah law does not permit. Because EMIA lacked 
standing to pursue a claim against Krueger in its own name, the 
trial court erred in awarding EMIA a portion of the interpleaded 
funds. 
CONCLUSION 
113 We c_onclude that EWA lacked standing to pursue a 
subrogation action against Krueger :in its own name. Thus, the · 
trial court erred in dividing the Wilsons1 settlement with EMIA. 
Ac~ordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand with 
instructions for the trial court to dismiss EMIA' s claims and 
award all of the interpleaded funds to the Wilsons. 
6. EMIA asserts that the correct approach would be to allow the 
insurer and the heirs to pursue separate claims to recover their 
respective shares of damages arising from a personal mjury 
claim. Such an approach w:ould unnecessarily . subject the 
defendant to multiple suits for the same conduct, see Johanson,, 
152 P.2d at 103,, and potentially compromise the heirs' superior 
right to recover their share of the personal injury claim,, · see Hill,, 
765 P.2d at 866. See Cederloff v. Whited,, 169 P.2d 777, 780 (Utah 
1946). 
20150150-CA 8 2016 UT App 38 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUMB 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/ 
.. ··• 
Randall R, Smart (2983) 
Jeffrey A. Callister (9962) · 
Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford 
A Professional Corporation 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 747~0647 
Facsimile: (801) 747-1049 
r.smart@utahlaw-smart.com 
ieff.cal lister@utahlaw-smart.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Educators Mutual Insurance Association 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UT AH COUNTY - PROVO DEPARTMENT 
EVERETT P. WILSON JR., DARLA 
WILSON, AND INGE VALDMANN 
and 




CADE M. KRUEGER 
Defendant(s) 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER REGARDING ALLOCATION OF 
INTERPLEADER AMOUNT DEPOSITED WITH 
THE COURT a.P'"'d Order o,P lPvi,So I~· da-~·1on 
Modified by the Court as U1_tderlined 
\Yo 4 00\ \ \ 
Case Number 110400083 
Judge Samuel D. Mc Vey 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on January 27, 2015, Judge Samuel D, 
Mc Vey presiding, Plaintiffs Evere.tt P. Wilson, Jr. and Darla Wilson (Everett P. Wilson, Jr. and 
Darla Wilson are referred to collectively as the "Wilsons,, where appropriate) were present and 
represented by counsel, Jaq}( C. Helgesen of Helgesen, Houtz & Jones, P.C. Plaintiff Educators 
Mutual Insurance Association ("EMIA") was represented by counsel, Jeffrey A. ~allister of Smart, 
Schofield, Shorter & L~.mceford, a professional corporation. The Court, after reviewing EMIA's 
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Brief Regarding Allocation of Interpleader Amount Deposited with the Court, Response to Brief on 
Interpleaded Funds; the Wilsons' Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief on Allocation I~terpleaded 
Funds and Memorandum in Support of Motion fo r Summary Judgment, Opposition to Educators 
Mutual Insurance Association's Brief Regarding Allocation of Interpleader Amount, and Reply 
Memorandum in Support o( Motion for Summary Judgment, and after hearing oral argu.ment and 
otherwise being fully advised, enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
·FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. EMIA and the Wilsons filed separate claims against the Defendant, Cade M. Krueger 
("Defendant"), based on losses suffered from the death of Jessica Wilson when Defendant struck 
her with his vehicle. 
2. Jessica Wi lson later died from the injuries she incurred. 
3. EMIA was the medical insurer of Jessica Wilson at all times relevant t~ this matter. 
4. The Wilsons are the parents of Jessica Wilson. 
5. EMIA sued Defendant for reimbursement of the medical expenses it paid in behalf of 
Jessica Wilson that were incurred when Defendant's vehicle struck her. 
6. The Wilsons sued Defendant for the wrongful death of Jessica Wilson. 
7. This Court ruled previously that the Wilsons' and EMIA' s suits against Defendant should 
be consolidated. 
& .. Defendant, through his insurer has interplead the policy limit of $100;000.00 with this 
Court. 
9. EMIA and the Wilsons have dismissed Defendant from the lawsuit with prejudice. 
I 0. The Wilsons have suffered damages for the loss, love and affection of their daughter, and 
Fel:iruary 06, 2015 09:30 AM 000843 
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funeral expenses, which exceed the $100,000.00 deposited with this Court. 
11. The amount of damages claimed by EMlA for the medical expenses paid in behalf of 
Jessica Wilson also exceed $100,000.00. · 
12. The $100,000.00 deposited with this Court is insufficient to satisfy the damages claimed 
by the Wilsons and EMIA. . 
13. EMIA received premiums for providing medical coverage to Jess ica Wi lson, however, 
those premiums do not equal the amount paid by EMIA for Jessica Wilson's medical expenses. 
14. The Wilsons have labored more than EMIA to acquire the $100,000.00 that was 
deposited with this Court by Defendant. 
15. EMIA sued the Defendant later than the Wilsons. 
16. The Wilsons have paid $33,334.00 in attorneys' fees and $18,301.38 in liti~ation costs. 
17. EMIA has also incurred attorney's fees and costs associated with their action against 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Consolida tion 
_l. EMIA' s action against Defendant and the Wilsons' action against Defendant should be 
consolidated. 
Allocation of the $100.000.00 
2. Interpleader actions filed pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 
equitable in nature. 
3: Where the parties' claims to the $100,000.00 interpl~ad with the Court exceed-that 
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amount, this Court must balance the equities and determine how that amount should be allocated. 
4. The equities that should be balanced in this matter are the Wilsons' loss of their daughter 
and EMIA' s claim for reimbursement for the medical expenses it paid out in behalf of Jessica 
Wilson. 
5. EMJA's action is l;,ased in contract, not tort. 
6. EMIA's contractual claim survives the death of Jessica Wilson. 
7. It is equitable to divide the $100,000.00 equally between the parties, specifically, 
$50,000.00 to the Wilsons and $50,000.00 to EMIA. 
8. It is equitable to reimburse the Wilsons for one half of their attorneys' fees and costs from 
EMIA's portion. Specifically, the Wilsons should be reimbursed $16,667.00 in attorneys' fees and 
$9,150.69 in costs from EMIA's portion. 
9. As a result, the Wilsons should receive $75,8 I 7.69 as their final portion of the· 
$100,000.00 and EMIA should receive $24,182.31 as its final portion of the $100,000.00. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED th.at: 
1. Case No. _ 140400 111 is consolidated with case no. 110400083. 
2. The Wilsons shall ·receive $75,817.69 of the $100,000.00 deposited with this c;;ourt and 
s~id amount shall be released immediately to the Wilsons. 
3. EMIA shall receive $24,182.3 I of the $100,000.00 deposited with this Court and said 
amount shall be released immediately to EMIA. 
4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to pay out the above sums as stated. 
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aPPROVED AS TO fORM 
/s/ Jack C. Helgesen with permission 
Jack C. Helgesen 
Attorney for Plaintiffs Everett and Darla Wilson · 
SIGNA:r°URE APPEARS AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 3rd day of February, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order regarding Allocation of Interpleader 
Amount Deposited with the Court to be served on each of the following people: 
Person's Name· and Address 
Jeffrey C. Miner 
Stephen F. Edwards 
Morgan, Minn.ock & James, LC. 
Keams Building, Eighth.Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 I 
Jack C. Helgesen 
Tonya Hardy 
Helgesen Houtz & Jones, P .C. 
February -06, 2015 09:30 AM 
Method of Service 
Court E-Filing Notification 
Court E-Filing Notification 
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( f) 
1513 North Hill Field Road #3 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Clerk, Fourth District Court 
Utah County, Provo Department 
125 North 100 West 
Provo UT 84601 
Isl Bonnie Jones 
Secretary 
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Randall R. Smart (2983) 
Jeffrey A. Callister (9962) 
The Order of Court if 
l)ate<;l: April l4, 201~. 
09:59:50 AM 
SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Munay, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 747-0647 
Facsimile: (801) 747-1049 
r. srnart(cv.u tahJ aw-smart. com 
ieff.callister(@,utahlaw-smart.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
UTAH COUNTY-PROVO DEPARTMENT 




CADE M. KRUEGER, an individual, and John 
Does 1 through 100 
Defendant(s) 
ORDER 
Case Number 140400111 
Judge S.~uel D. Mc Vey 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on Defendant Cade M. Krueger's 
("Defendant") Motion to Dismiss., on March 31, 2014. Plaintiff Educators Mutual Insurance 
Association ("Plaintiff') was represented by its counsel of record, Randall R. Smart_ and Jeffrey 
A. Callister, attorneys at law, of Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford, a Professional 
Corporation, and Defendant was represented by bis counsel of record, Stephen F. Edwards of, 
Morgan, Minnock, Rice & James, L.C. Tue Court having heard oral argument and being fully 
advised ori the premises, and b~sed on Defendant's Motion ·to Dismiss and the Me~orandum in 
1 
000822 
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( ·t,; 
Support of said Motion, ·Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss, and Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
ITIS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-21-108 is a specific part of the Utah Code meant to 
deal with Insurance Com~any Plaintiffs in the subrogation context. 
2. In regard to the determination as to whether or not Plaintiff has standing in this 
matter, Utah Code Ann. Section 3 lA-21-108 applies and Utah Code Ann. Sections 78B-2-105, 
78B-3-l 06 and 78B-3-l 07 do not apply. 
3. Pmsuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 3 lA-21-108, an insurer may brmg an action 
to subrogate in ~ither its name or the name of i1:8 insured. 
4. · Plaintiff's insured, the late Jessica Wilson, specifically agreed in her insurance 
policy with Plaintiff that Plaintiff was entitled to recovery against a third-party tort feasor. 
5. Plaintiff has standing to file this lawsuit. 
6. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
Approved as to form: 
MoRGAN, MINNocK, RlcE & JAMES, L.C. 
Isl STEPHEN F. EowARDS (v.'lTH PERM1ss10N) 
Stephen F. Edwaxds 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of April, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoin.g O RDER to be served on each of the following people: 
Persori's Name and Address 
Jeffrey C. Miner 
Stephen F. Edwards 
Morgan, Minnoclc & James, L.C. 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Clerk of Court 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department 
450 South State Street 
SaltLalceCity, Utah 84111 
Method of Service 
Court E-Filing Notification 
Electronic Filing 
/s/ Susan Strunk 
Legal Assistant 
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EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT - VERNAL 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AGCS MARINE INSURANCE COMP.AN¥ vs. A.OLER HOT OIL S~RVICE· INC 
~SE Nl:JMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
:DR-RENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
EDWIN T PETERSON 
?ARTIES 
Plaintiff - AGCS MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY 
Represented by: 'l'HOMAS M REGAN 
Plaintiff - G~T AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPA 
Represented by: MARK D TAYLOR 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Represented by: BRANDEE R LYNCH 
Plaintiff - JESUS OLIVERA 
Represented by: MARK p TAYLOR 
Represented by: THOMAS M FEGAN 
Plaintiff - LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Plaintiff - N.l\TIONAL AMERICAN INSURANCE 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Plaintiff - PEERLESS INDEMNITY INSURANCE C 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Plaintiff - SENTINEL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Represented by: KENNETH W MAXWELL 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Plaintiff - SNELSON COMPANIES INC 
RP.presented by: MARK D TAYLOR 
Rcprc:Gc:nted by: THOMP-.. S M REGAN 
Represented by: BRANDEE R LYNCH 
Plaintiff - ST PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMP 
Represented-by: JOHN H COLTER 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Plaintiff - TODD DEETZ 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Represented by: DAVID A REAY 
Plaintiff - WEATHORFORD US LP 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
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~~SE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
\ 
Represented by: RYAN R JIBSON 
Plaintiff. -· ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY · 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Plaintiff - WESTERN NATIONAL ASSURANCE COM 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Plaintiff - AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Pl~intiff - ANDY REPPOND 
Represented by: GRETCHEN H JOHNS 
Plaintiff - BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE CO 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN. 
Plaintiff - CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS 
Represented by: KENNETH W MAXWELL 
Represented by; THOMAS M REGAN. 
-Plaintiff - FARM BUREAU PROPERTY & CASUALT 
Represented by: TRENT J WADDOUPS 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Plaintiff - FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
Represented by: KENNETH W MAXWELL 
Represented by: THOMAS M REGAN 
Plaintiff - FLINT ENERGY SERVICES INC 
Represented by: GRETCHEN H JOHNS 
Plaintiff - CRAIGS ROUSTABOUT SERVICE INC· 
Represented by: TERRY M PLANT 
Represented by: JEREMY M SEELEY 
Repres~nted by: MATTHEW D CHURCH 
Plaintiff·- ·DALB-RNI HOLDINGS INC 
Represented by: TERRY M PLANT 
Represented by: JEREMY M SEELEY 
Represented by: MATTHEW D CHURCH 
Plaintiff - ~ORTH SALES COMPANY INC 
Represented by: TERRY M PLANT 
Represented by: JEREMY M SEELEY 
Represented by: MATTHEW D CHURCH 
Plaintiff - FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE 
Represented by: KIRSTEN S GRISWOLD 
Plaintiff - NABORS COMPLETION AND PRODUCTI - DISMISSED· 
Represented by: KIRSTEN S GRISWOLD 
Plaintiff - EMM REALTY OF UTAH LLC 
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:A.SE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damag~. 
Represented by: L RICH HUMPHERYS 
Represente~ by: MICHAEL D JOHNSTON 
Represented by: RYAN R BECKSTROM 
Defendant - ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE INC 
Represented by: JONATHAN L HAWKINS 
Represented by: JOSEPH·E MINNOCK 
Defendant - CHANDLER MANUFACTURING INC 
Represented by: PAUL.M BELNAP 
Represented by: RYAN P ATKINSON 
Repres~nted by: CHET W NEILSON 
Doing Business As - TODD DEETZ ENT {DEETZ, TODD) 
Third Pty Cmplainant - AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE CO ASO R 
Represented by: LARRY·R WHITE 
Represented by: PAUL D VANKOMEN 
Represented by: ELLIOT B SCRUGGS 
\CCOUNT SUMMARY 



























REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: 3RD PR'T.'Y CMPLT lOK + 
Amount Due: 155.00 




)2-26-15 Filed: C~mplaint 
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~~SE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
)2-26-15 Case filed 
)2-26-15 Judge EDWIN T PETERSON assigned. 
)2-26-15 Fee Account created Total Due: 
)2-26-15 Pee Accow1L -created 
)2-26-15 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S 









)2-27-15 Filed: Motion to Intervene/Join in behalf of Auto Owners 
Insurance, A/S/0 Ronald Horrocks 
)2-27-15 Filed: Amended Complaint 
)2-27-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-27-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-02-15 Filed return: Acceptance of Service upon JOSE~H E. MINNOCK for 
Party Served: ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE INC 
Service Type: Personal 
.Service Date: March 02, 2015 
)3-02-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-03-15 Filed: Appearance o_f Counsel/No_tice of Li~ited Appearar1ce: 
Notice of Entry of Appearance of Counsel 
)3-03-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-06-15 Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance for 
Farm Bureau Property Casualty Company 
)3-06-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-17-15 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit for Decision (Intervening 
Plaintiffs Motion to Intervene - Unopposed) 
)3-17-15 Filed: .Order (P~oposed) Granting Filing of Intervening 
Complaint by Auto Owners Insurance Co., A/S/0 Ronald Horrocks 
)3-17 l.G Piled: Raturn of ElecLLOliiG Notificatinn 
)3-20-1~ Filed: .Notice of Appearance 
)3-20-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-20-15 Filed order: ·order Grantl11g Filing 9f Inlervening Complaint by 
Auto Owners_ Insurance Co., A/S/0 Roualcl Horrocks 
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON 
Signed March 20, 201.5_ 
.)3-20-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3~23-15 ~iled: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance 
Notice of Appearance_of Ryan R. Jibson 
)3-23-15 File4: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-23-15 Filed: Answer and Reliance on Jury-Demand 
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:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE INC 
B-23-15 Note: Cert.i ficate of Readiness for Trial am~ 04/04/2016 
)3-23-15 Filed: NOTICE OF EVENT DUE DATES 
)3-23-15 Filed: Return of Rlectro~ic Notification 
)3-26-15 Filed: Third Party Complaint Intervening Complaint of Auto 
Owners Insurance Co. 
)3-26-15 Fee Account created · Total Due: 155.00 
)3-26-15 3RD PRTY CMPLT lOK + Payment Received:· _155. 00 
)3-26-15 Filed: Return of E~ectronic Notification· 
)3-26-15 Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice ul Limited AppeaL·,:1.(1Ce David 
Reay for.Todd Deetz 
)3-26-15 Filed: Return of· Electronic Notification 
)3-26-15 Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance in 
behalf of Auto Owners Insurance Co., A/S/O·Ronald Horrocks 
)3-26-15 Filed: Return of.Electronic Notification 
)3-30-15 Filed: Motion Pro Hae Vice Admission of Mersfelder and Consent 
of Local Counsel 
Filed by: FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE,. 
)3-30-15 Filed: Motion Pro Hae Vice Admission of Pollock and Consent of 
Local Counsel 
.Filed by: FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
)3-30-15 Filed: Order (Proposed) Granting Mersfelder Pro Hae Vice 
Admission 
)3-30-15 Filed: Order (Proposed) Granting Pollock Pro Hae Vice Admission 
)3-30-1-5 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-30-15 Fileq. order: Order Granting Merefelder Pro Hae Vice l\.dmission 
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON 
Signed March 3 O, 2 015 · 
JJ-30-15 Fi led orc.le.r.·: Order Granting Pollock Pro Hae Vi r.c Admil::ls.ion 
vo Judge EDWlN T PETERSON 
Signed Mc:1.n:.!h 3 0, 2 OlS 
vi> 









Return of El~ctronic Notification-
Appe~rance of Counsel/Notice uf Limited App~arance 
Return of Electronic Notification· 
Ap~earance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance. 
Notice of Appearance of Counsel for Craigs.Roustabout Service, 
Inc., Dalbo-RNI Holdings, I~c., and Kenworth Sales Co . 
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:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
)4-02-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)4-29-15 Filed: Motion: Stipulation· of Dismissal for Nabors Completion 
and Production Services with Prejudice 
Filed by:. NABORS COMPLETION AND PRODUCT~, 
)4-29-15 Filed: Order (Proposed) of Dismissal for Nabors Completion and 
Production Services' with Prejudice 
)4-29-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)4--3 0-15 Filed order: Order of Dismissal for Nabors Completion and · 
Production Services ~ith Prejudice 
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON 
Signed.April 30, 2015 
)4-30-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)5-04-15 ~ismissed party - NABORS COMPLETION AND 
.)5-07-15 Filed: SECOND NOTICE OF EVENT DUE DATES 
)5-19-15 Filed: Appea~ance of Counsel/Notice of L1mited Appearance 
Notice of Appearance 
)5-19-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)6-01-15 Filed: Motion Pro Hae Vice Motion and consent of. sponsoring 
local connsel for pro hac vice admission of Kenneth Januszewski 
Filed by: ST PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMP, 
)6-01-15 Filed: Order (Proposed) Proposed Order of admission of pro hac 
vice attorney 
)6-01-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)6-04-15 Filed order: Order Proposed Order of admission of pro hac vice 
attorney 
Judge F.DWTN T PETERSON 
Signed June 04, 2ois 
. )6-04-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
.)7-15-15 Filed return: Accep~~nr.~ of Service upon ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE 
for 
PQr.ty Served: CHANDLER MANUFACTURING INC 
Service Type: Personal· 
Service Date: July 15, 2015 
)7-15-15 Filed: Return of Electr<?nic Notification 
)0-04-15 1''iled: Answer of Chandler Mfg., LLC to Plu.intiffo Amended 
C_o~plaint and Rella.nee on Jury Demand 
CHANDLER MANUFACTURING INC 
)8-04-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
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:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
)8-ll-15 Filed: Motion to.Consolidate Actions 
Filed by: CHANDLER MANUFACTURING INC, 
)8-11-15 Filed: MP.mnrnndum in Support uf Motion to Consolicate Actions 
. . . 
)8-11-15 Filed: Exhibit~ to Memorandum in Support of Motion-to 
Consolidate Actiono 
)8-11-15.Filed: Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Consolidate.Actions 
)8-11-15 Filed: Exhibit C to Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Consolidate Actions 
)8-11-15 Filed: Exhibit D to Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Consolidate-Actions 
)8--11-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)8·-24-15 Filed: Memo~andum Plaintiffs Response Memoran_dom of 
Non-Opposition to· Defendant Chandler MF~-, LLCs Motion to 
Consolidate Actions 
)8-24-15 Filed: Proof of Service 
)8-24-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
VP L0-05-15 Filed: ·Request/Notice to.Submit Motion to Consolidate Actions 
L0-05-15 Filed: Return of Electronic.Notification 
L0-21-15 Filed order: Ruling and Order w/Certificate of Notification 
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON 
Signed October 21, 2015 
~2-01-15 Filed: Substitution of Counsel 
L2-01-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
L2-07-15 Filed: Proposed Stipulated Schedule Order Thereon 
l2-07-15 Filed: Proof of Service 
vd L2-07-15 Filed: O~der (Proposed) Proposed Stipulated Sc~edule Order 
Thereon. 
l2-07-15 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
I ?.-1.5-15 Filed order: Order Proposed Stipulated Schedule Order Thereon 








Signed Decembe1 15, 2015 
Return of Electronic Notification 
Initial Disclosures 
Proof of Service 
Return of Electronic Notification 
Initial Disclosures, Todo Deetz 
Certificate of Service: Initial Disclosures, Todd Deetz 
Return of Electronic Notification 
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:'ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
)1-22-16 Filed: Initial Disclosures Reppond Flint 
n-22--16 Filed: Cert of Service Initial Disclosures: Reppond Flint 
)1-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-22-:!.6 Filed: Certificate of Servi.Ge for Plaintiff Factor Mutual 
Insurance Rule 26 Discl.osures 
)~-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-22-16 Filed: CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE OF INTERVENING PLAINTIFF AUTO 
OWNERS INSURANCE CO., A/S/O RONALD HORROCKS INITIAL DISCLOSURES 
)1-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-22-16 Filed: : COS Great American Insurance Co Initial Disclosures 
)1-22-16 Filed: Return of _Electronic Notification 
)1-22-16 Filed: :· COS Snelson Companies Initial° Disclosures 
Jl-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-22-16 Filed: Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs Certain 
Underwriters At Lloyds, Fire Insurance Exchange and Sentinel 
Insurance Company Initial Rule 26(a) (1) Disclosure Stateme~t 
)1-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1~22-16 Filed: Certificate of Service on EMM: Realty of Utah LLCs Rule 
26 Initial-Disclosures 
)1-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Jl-22-16 Filed: Plaintiffs Craigs Roustabout Service, Inc.s, Dalbo-RNI 
Holdings, Inc., and Kenworth Sales Companys Initial Disclosures 
and Preliminary Designation of Expert Witnesses 
)1-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-22-16 Filed: Certificate of Service of Weatherford U.S., LPs Rule 
26 (a) (1) Ir1:itial .Disclos_ures 
Jl-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)1-22-16 Fi7.P.d: COS Farm Bureau R26al 
n-~~-1 fi Filed: Return of Electron·; c Notification 
)1~26-16 Filed: Certificate of Service 
Jl-26-16.Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-05-16 Fi:led: Certificate of ServicP. of ·EMM Realty of Utah LLCs Fin=it. 
Set of Inlerrugatories and Request for Product:ion of Documents 
to Each Plaintiff Asserting a Subrogation CJ.aim 
}.2-05-16 Filed=· Certificate of Servi r.P. of ~MM Realty of Utah LLCs First 
Set of Interrogatories and RP.quest for Production of Documents 
to Defendants· 
)2-05-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-05-16 Filed: Amended Certificate of Service on EMM Realty of Utah 
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:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
LLCs First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
of Documents to· Each Plaintiff Asserting a Subrogation Claim 
)2-05-16 Filed: Amended- Certificate of Service on EMM Realty of Utah 
LLCs First S~t of InLerrogatories and Requests for Production 
~ of Documents to Defendants 
)2-05-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-10-16 Filed: Motion for Pro Hae Vice Admission and Consent of Local 
Counsel 
Filed by: FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
)2-10-16 Filed: Order (Proposed) for Pro Hae Vice Admission and Consent. 
of Local.Counsel 
)2-10-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-10-16 Filed order: Order for Pro Hae Vice Admission and Consent of 
Local Counsel 
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON 
Signed February 10, 2016 
)2-10-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-12-16 Filed: Appearance of Counsel/Notice of Limited Appearance: 
Notice of Entry of Appearance of Counsel Brandee Lynch 
)2-l?.-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-12-16 Filed: = COS Jesus Oliveras Initial Disciosures 
)2-12-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-26-16 Filed: Certificate of Service (Initial Disclosures of Chandler 
Mfg. I LLC) 
)2-26-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)2-26-16 Filed: : COS: Defendant Adler Hot Oil Service, Inc.s Rule 
~ 26(~) {l) Initial Disclosures 
)2-26-16 Filed: Retuin of Electronic·Notification 
)2-29-16 Filed: Motion to Join Insureds as Plaintiffs Pursuant to URCP 
17 (a) _and 21 
Filed by: WESTERN NATIONAL ASSURANCE COM, 
)2-29-16 Filed: Memorandum ISO Pltfs Motion to Join Insureds as 
Plaintiffs Pursuant to URCP 1·7 (a) and 21 
)2-29-16 Filed: Certificate of Service 
)2-29-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
~ )2-29-16 Filed: Motion to Join sub1:ogo1:s as N'amed Plaintiffs 
Filed by: FARM BUREAU PROPERTY & CASUALT, 
)2-29-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-01-16 Filed: Motion to Join Subrogor Robert Horrocks as a Party 
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~~SE NUMBER 150800020 Prope~ty Damage 
Pursuant to U.R.C.P. 17(A), 21 
Filed by: AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE CO ASO R, 
)3-01-16 F.i.let1:· Rt:!Lun1 of Electronic Notification 
)3-01-16 Filed: Motfon Sentinel Insurance Companys, Certain Undcrwritcra 
at Lloyds, and Fire- Insurance Exchanges Motion to Join 
Sul.Jr.·0901.·s as Parties Under U. R. C. P. 17 (a) , 21 
Filed by: FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANG~, 
)3-01-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-01-16 Filed: Motion: Factory Insurance Companys Motion to Pursue 
Previously Asserted Claims in the Names of.,Its Insureds 
Filed by: FACTORY MUTUAL INSURANCE, 
)3-01-16 Fil:d: O~der (Proposed) Regarding Factory 'insurance Companys 
· Motion to Pursue Previously Asserte<l: Claims in the ··Names of Its 
Insureds 
)3-01-16 Filed: Motion: Great American Insurances Motion to Join 
Insured as Plaintiff and Memo in Support 
Filed by: GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPA, 
)3-01-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-01-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-02-16 Filed: Motion to Amend 
Filed by: 'ST PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMP, 
)3-02-16 Filed: Memorandum ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANYS 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE INSUREDS NAME 
AS PARTY IN INTEREST 
)3-02-16 Filed: Order (Proposed} ORDER GRANTING ST. PAUL MERCURY 
INSURANCE COMP.ANYS MOTION TO SUBSTITUT~ INSUREDS NAME AS PARTY 
IN INTEREST 
)3-02-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-04-16 Filed: Certificate of Service 
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-04-16 Filed: : COS Great.American Ins Co Responses and Objections to. 
EMM Realtys First Set .IRPDs 
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of Electrqnic Notification 
)3-04-·16 Filed: Certificate of Service of Discovery Responses 
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-04-16 Filed: : Certificate of Service of Discoveiy Responses 
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-04-~6 Filed: COS responses to EMM int~rrogs RfP -
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of.Electronic Notification 
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:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
)3-04-16 Filed: Certificate of Service for Factory Insurance Response to 
EMM Discovery 
)3-04-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-07-16 Filed: : Certificate of Service of Defendant·Adler Hot Oil 
Services, Inc.s First Set of Requests for Production of 
Documents to·EMM Realty of Utah 
)3-0'l-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-08-16 Filed order: Order Regarding Factory Insurance Companys Motion 
to Pursue Previously Asserted Claims in the Names ef Its 
Insureds 
Judg~ EDWIN T PETERSON 
Sign~d March 08 ,· 2016 
)3-08-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
B-08-16 Filed: Objec.::Llon to Entry of Orde:r:. Regarding Factory Mutual 
Insurance Companys Motion to Pursue Claims Previously Asserted 
in the Names of Its Insureds 
)3-08-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
~ B-09-16 Filed: Cos Auto Owners Ins Response to BMM .J:t'irst Set of 
Inter.rogatories and RfPoD 
B-09-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-11-i6 Filed: Chandler Mfg., LLCs Joinder to EMlVIs Objection to Entry 
of Order Regarding Factory Mutual Insurance Companys Motion to 
Pursue Claims Previously Asserted in the Names of its Insureds 
)3-11-16 Fil~d: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-11-16 Filed: Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Factory Mutual. 
Insurance Company and Sentinel Insurance Companys Claims 
Against Defendants; and 
FilP.d. by= EMM RRALTY OF UTAH LLC, 
11 11-16 Filed: Return of Elect.rord.c Notification 
)J··ll-lG PJled: Proof of Se:t.-vicP. 
)3-11-16 Fi.led: Return of Elcctronlt; Notification 
n 14-16 Filed: Opposition to Motions to Add insureds as ParL.i8s 
B-14-16 Filed: Return of Eler.tronic .Notification 
B-14-16 Filed: Certificate of Service 
B-14 -16 Filed·: Return of Electronic Not if icat ion 
)3-18-16 Filed: Certificate of Servi~ 
)3-18-16-Fiied: __Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-22-16 Filed: Reply in support of Farm Bureaus Motion to Add Subrogors 
as. Parties 
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~SE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
)3-22-16 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit re: Plaintiffs Motion· to Add 
Subrogors as Parties 
)3-22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
11-7.?.-16 Filed: Reply ST. PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANYS '.REPLY IN 
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO STJBS'T'TTUTE INSUREDS NAME AS PARTY IN 
INTERES'r 
)3~22-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-25-16 Filed: Opposition to: Factory Mutual Insurance Response to EMM 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of Factorys 
Motion to Purs~e Claims in the the Name of their Insureds 
)3-25-16. Filed: Factory opposition to EMM MSJ Exhibits 1-6 
)3-25-16 Filed: Factory opposition to EMM MSJ Exhibits 7-13 
)3-25-16 Filed: Factory opposition to EMM MSJ Exhibits 14-17 
)3-25-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-25-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)3-25-16 Filed: Memorandum In Opposition to EMM Realty of Utahs MSJ and 
Reply Memo ln Support of Mot:ion to Pursue Claims In Name of 
Insured 
)3-25-16 Filed: Exhibit 1 to Memo In Opposition to MSJ 
D-?5-lfi Filed: Exhibit ~ to Mcrno In Opposition to w;,J 
)3-25-16 Filed: .J:!;xhibit.s 3-]0 LO Memo In Oppus.i.Lion to MSJ 
)3-25-16 Filed: Return of E;lectronic Notif_ication 
)3-25-16 Filed: Exhibits 11-12 to Memo In Opposition to MSJ 
)3-25-16 Filed: Exhibits 13-14 to Memo In Opposition to MSJ 
)3-25-16 Filed: EY...hibits 15-25 to Memo In Opposition to MSJ 
)3-25-16 Filed: "Ret-.urn of Electronic Notification 
)3-28-16 Filed: AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE CO., A/S/0 RONALD HORROCKS REPLY 
,, 
IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO JOIN INSUREDS NAMF. AS A PARTY IN 
INTEREST 
)3-28-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
B-28-16 Filed: R~.E:Jly lu Support' of Plaintiffs Motion -to Jo:i.n Their · 
Insureds as Plaintiffs Pursuant to URCP 17(a) ;3.11.d 21 
)3-28-16 Filed: Certificate of Service · 
)J-20-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Not:i f:ication 
)J 3 O 16 Filed: : COS: Def enrJ~,1n 1-. Adler Hot Oil Service, Inc. a RccponB~:::: 
to EMM Realty of Utahs First Set of b:j_scovery Requests 
)3-30-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
• • I 
)4-01-16 Filed: Reply Memorandum· in Support of EMM Re.alty of. Utah LLCs 
Motion ·for Summary Judgment Dismissi_ng Factory Mutual Insurance 
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~~SE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
Company and Sentinentel Insurance Companys Claims Against 
,Defendants 
)4-01-16 Filed: Exhibit.A to Reply Memoran4um in Support of EMM Realty 
of Utahs Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Factory Mutual 
Incurance Company and Se11tinel Insurance Companys Claims 
Against Defendants 
)4-01-1 Ei Filed: Re.turn of Electronic ·Notification 
)4-11-16 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit for Decision (1) Factory Mutual 
and Sentinels Motions to Join Subrogors As Parties and {2)·EMM· 
Realtys Matin for Summary Judgment Dismissing Factory Mutual 
and Sentinels Claims Against Defendants 
)4-11-16 riled: Return of Electronic Notification 
)4-11-16 Filed: Certificate of Service o'f Discovery Served Upon 
Defendant Chandler Mfg., LLC 
)4-11-16 Filed: Request for Hearing /to Submit EMM Realtys Motion for 
Summary Judgment Di~missing factory and Sentinel Insurance with 
Oral Argument Requested 
{.;;;D )4-11-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)4-11-16 Filed:· Return of Electronic Notification 
)4-21-16 Filed; Sentinel Insurance Companys, Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyds and Fire Insurance ExchQilgec Errata To Correct Title Of 
Motion Tu Bt= Cuuslstent With Relief Sought 
)4-21-16.Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)4-25-16 Filed: Certificate of Servtce: EMM Realty of Ut.ah LLCs Response 
to Defendant Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc Firs~ Set Of Requests 
for Production of Documents 
~ )4-25-16 Filed: Return.of Electronic Notification 
)4 ·· 7. 9 -16 P:i.J.e<1: Mot.ion for Protective Or.aP.r 
Filed by: ADLER Ho.~ .. OIL SERVICE INC, 
)4-::-:9-16 Filed: Rt::Luu1 u[ Electronic .NotifiG<:1t:ion 
vi) )4-29-16 F;i.led: Stipulation for Dismissal 
)4-29-16 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit Request to !::>ubmit 
)4-29-16 Filed: Order (Proposed) Order· of Dismi :;.Rr1l 
i4-29--16 Filed: R~turn of Blectronjr. Nnt:ification 
)5 ·· 02-16 Filed order: Ornr..r of Dicmissa],. 
Ii) JµJ.ge EDWIN T .f.1ETERSON 
Signed May 02, 2016 · 
)5-02-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)5-09-16 Filed: Certificate of Service (Defendant Chandler Mfg.; LLCs 
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:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
Responses to Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, Fire Insurance 
Exchanges, and Sentinel Insurance Companys First Set of 
Requests for Admission) 
)5-09-l.6 Filed: Return of Electrc:mi.c .Notification 
~, 
)5-13-16 Filed: Request/Notice to Submit: Request to Submit for 










Order (Proposed): Protective Orde~~ 
Return of Electronic Notification 
Request/Notice to Submit To Submit For Decision 
Return of Electronic Notificat1on 
Filed: Certificate of Service (Defendant Chandler Mfg;, LLCs 
Responses to Plaintif.fs Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, Fire 
. . 
Insurance Exchanges, and Sentinel Insurance Companys First Set 
of lnterrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents) 
)5-23-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)5-24-16 Filed order: Order: Protective Order 
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON 
Signe~ May 24, 2016 
)5-24-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)5-26-16 Filed: Notice of Rule 30(b} (6) Deposition.of Adler Hot Oil 
Services, ·Inc., and Adler Hot Oil Services, LLC 
)5-26-16 Filed! Notice of Rule 30(b) (6) Video Conference n~position of 
Chandler Mfg., LLc,· f/k/a Chandler Manufacturing Inc. 
)5-26-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)6-07-16 Filed: Proof of Service of Discovery Requests to Adler 
)~-07-16 Filed: Proof of service of Discovery Requests to Chandler 
j6-07--16 Filed: Return of Electronic ~otific;::it.:ion 
)6-10-16 Filed: Otller -· Not Siqned Orde:t:.· (Proposed) ORDRR GRAN'l'ING ST. 
PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANYS MOTION TO SUBSTI'l'UTB INSUREDS 
NAM.g AS PARTY·TN INTEREST 
)6-10-l.6 Nole~ A n.1·1 ing and order on this icE;ue will be P-ntcred_ Bho_rtl y. 
)6-10-16 Filed: Return of Elet:L.conic Notification 
)6-10-16 Filed order! Rulih~ and Or~er 
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON 
.. 
Signed ~up.e 10, 2016 
)6~10-16 MOTIONS HEARING/ORAL ARGUMENTS scheduled orr July 18, 2016 at 
01 : 3 0 PM- in ROOM 2· with Judge PETERSO~. 
)6-10-16 Notice -. NOTICE for Ca.se 150800020 ID 17504817 
MOTIONS HE.ARING/ORAL AR.GUMENTS is scheduled. 
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~sE·NUMBER 150800020 ,Property Damage 
Date: 07/fB/2016. 
Time : 01 : 3 o p . m. 
Location-: ROOM· 2 
Vernal District Court 
920 East Hwy 40 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Before Judge: EDWIN T PETERSON 
)6-10-16 Filed: Notice for Case 150800020 ID 17504817 
)6-21-16 Filed: Certificate of Service {Chandler Manufacturings First 
Set of Interrogatories· and Requests for Production of Documents 
to Adler Hot Oil Services) 
)6-21-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)7-01-16 Filed: Motion for Leave to Appear Teleph?nically for Oral 
Argument 
Filed by: WESTERN NATIONAL ASSURANCE COM, 
)7.-01-16 Filed: Proof o'f Service 
)7-01-16 Filed: Order (P~oposed) Regarding Motion for Leave to Appear 
Tel.ephonically for Oral Argument 
)7-01-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)7-03-16 Filed order: Order Regar?ing Motion for Leave to Appear 
Telephonically for Or.al Argument. 
Judge EDWIN T PETERSON 
Signed July 03, 2016 
)7-03-16 Filed: Return of Elec~ronic Notification 
)7-05-16 Filed: Certificate of Service Chandler MFG Responses To 
Plaintiffs AGCS Marine Insurance Companys, Allstate Indemnity 
Compa.uys,_ American Family Insurances, RP.rir River Mutual 
Insurance Companys, Liberty Mul:.ual Fire Insurance Company 
)7 05-16 Filed: Return of Electr0nic Notification 
)7-06-16 Filed: Certiticate of Service (ChandlE=r Mig. s Second Set of 
Interrogatoric:::; and Requests for Prod1.1~t.:icm of Documents to 
Adler Hot Oil Services) 
)7 ·· 06-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)7-l4-16 Filed: Certificate of Servicf:! (Chandler Mf~., J,T.c~s Third Set of 
. · Interrogatoriei.i n.nd Requests fox- Production of Documents to 
Acller Hot Oil Servi·ces) 
Y/-14-16 Filed: Return of Electronic· Notification 
)7-15-16 Filed: Certificate of Service (De.fendant Chandler Mfg., LLCs 
Responses to Plaintiff EMM Realty of Utah, LLCs Requests for 
~ ✓ 
~rinted: 08/26/16 11:48:57 Pa~e 15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Pr.operty Damage 
Production of Documents and Interrogatories) 
')7-15-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)7-18-16 TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE scheduled on December 05, 2016 at 
01:00 ,PM in ROOM 2 with Judge PETERSON. 
)7-18-16 M.inut'e Entry - MOTIONS HEARING/ORAL ARGUMENTS 
Judge: EDWIN T PETERSON 
Clerk: . brianl 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s}: MATTHEW D CHURCH 
L RICH HUMPHERYS 
RYAN R JIBSON 
GRETCHEN H JOHNS 
MICHAEL D JOHNSTON 
BRANDEE R LYNCH 
KENNETH W MAXWELL 
THOMAS M REGAN 
MARK D TAYLOR 
TRENT J WADDOUPS 
Defendant's Attorney{s): RYAN P ATKINSON 
JOSEPH E MINNOCK 
Audio 
~ape Number: Vcrn2 Tape Count: 3:07:25 
Thomas Regan appears teiephonically. Dart Winkler and Kenneth 
Januszewski appear pro.hac vice. The Court hears from counsel. A 
resblution may have been reached, and the is$ues are discussed wilh 
the Court. Thi :=:i m8tter is set for 'feleph.onic Status Cc.mier~1ice on 
12/05/2016 at l p. m. Mr. T,. Ri c'!h Humperyrs will prepare ;:i.n order 
b~~P.<l on today;s proceedings. (3:32:53) 
TIME: 3:07:25 PM 
1~LEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date;_ 12/05/2016 
Time: 01:00 p.m. 
Location: ROOM.2 
Vernal D"istrict Court 
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:ASE NUMBER 150800020 Property Damage 
920 East Hwy 40 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Before Judge: EDWIN T PETERSON 
)7-20-16 Filed: Ncitice of Depositions of Ryan Runolfson, RMon 
~ Chamberlain, and Adler Hot Oil Services, LLC 
~ 
~ 
)7-20-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 





Supplemental Initial Disclosures 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
F~l.ed: Amended Notice of Depositions of Ryan Runolfson, RMon 
Chamberlain, and Adler Hot Oil Services, LLC 
Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
Filed: : COS: Defendant Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc.s Responses 
to EMM Realty of Utahs Request.s for Production of Documents and 
·Interrogatories to Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc., and Adler Hot 
011 Services, LLC 
)7-27-16 Filed: : COS: Defendant Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc.s Responses·. 
~ 
~ to Chandler Manufacturing, LLCs First Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Documents to Adler Hot Oil 
Servi.ces 
)7-27-16. Filed: : CU8: Defendant An ler Hul O.il ~::;~rvices, Iuc.o Responses 
to Chandler Manufacturing, LLCs Second Set of Interrogatories 
and Requests for Production of Docume.uLs to Adler. Hot Oil 
Services 
)7-27-16 Filed: : COS: Defendant Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc.s Responses 
to Chandler Manufacturing~ L~Cs Third Set of _Interrogatories 
~ and Requests for Production of Documents to Adler Hot Oil 
Services 
)7-27-16 Filed: : COS: Defendant Adler Hot Oil Services, Inc., and Adler 
Hot Oil Services LLCs Responses to AGCS Marine Insurance 
Company, et als, Fir~t Set of Interrogatories and Requests for 
Product:i.nn of Documenls 
)7-27-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)7-29-16 Filed: Certificate of Service Plaintiff EMM Realty of Utah LLCs 
Flrst Supplemental Disclosures 
)7-29-16 Filed: Return of El~ctronic Notification 
)8.-01-16 Filed: : Not~ce 0£ Deposition oi: Robert Lapi.ri 
)8-01.-16 Filed: Return o~ Electronic Notification 
)8-03-16 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Jesus Olivera 
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~SE NUMBER 150800020 Prop~rty Damage 
)8-03-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification ~ 
)B-10-16 Filed: : Notice of Telephone Conference 
)8-10-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)8-17-16 Filed: : Amended Notice of Deposition 
)8-17-16 Fiied: Return of Electronic Notification 
)8-23-16 Filed: : Amended· Notice of Deposition of Jesu~ Olivera Gt) 
)8-23-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
)8-25"-16 Filed: : Amended Notice of Deposition of Jesus Olivera 
)8-25-16 Filed: : Amended Notice of Deposition of Robert Lapin 
)8-25-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification ~ 
)8-25-16 Filed: Adler Hot Oil Designation of Rule 30 (b) (6) Witnesses 
)8:-25-16 Filed: Return of Electronic Notification 
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Thomas M. Regan (#09642) 
COZEN O'CONNOR 
501 West Broadway, #1610 
San Diego, California 92101 
Telephone: 619.234. I 700 . 
Toll Free Phone: 800.782.3366 
Facsimile:· 619.234.7831 
tregan@cozen.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
· AGCS Marine Insurance Company; Allstate 
Indemnity Company; American Family 
Insurance; Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company; Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance 
Company; National American Insurance; 
Peerless Indemnity Insurance Company; and 
Western National Assurance Company 
* Additional counsel and their clients are set forth in Exhibit 1 attached hereto. 
JN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, UNIT AH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
) 
AGCS MARINE INSURANCE CO:MPANY; ) 
- ALLSTATEJNDEMNITYCOivIPANY; ) 
AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE; ANDY ) 
REPPOND; BEAR RNER MUTUAL ) 
INSURANCECOMPANY;CERTAIN ) 
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS; FARM ) 
BUREAU PROPERTY & CASUALTY ) 
INSURANCE COMP ANY; FIRE INSURANCE ) 
EXCHANGE; FLINT ENERGY SERVICES, ) 
INC.; GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY; JESUS OLIVERA; LIBERTY ) 
MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY; ) 
NATIONAL AMERICAN INSURANCE; ) 
PEERLESS INDEMNITY INSURANCE ) 
COMP ANY; SENTINEL INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY; SNELSON CO:MPANIES, INC.; ) 
ST. PAUL :NIERCURY INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY; TODD DEETZ D/B/A TODD ) 
DEETZ ENT; WEATHERFORD U.S., LP; ) 




Civil Case No.: 150800020 
Complaint Filed: Fe~ruary 26, 2015 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
JURY DEMAND 
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INSURANCE C01Y1PANY; CRAIG'S 
ROUSTABOUT SERVICE, INC.; NABORS 
COMPLETION AND PRODUCTION 
. SERVICES CO.; DALBO-RNI HOLDINGS, 













ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC., a Utah ) 
corporation; CHANDLER MANUFACTURING,) 
INC., a Texas corporation; and DOES 1 through 
50, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs AGCS MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY; ALLSTATE INDEMNITY 
COMPANY; AMERICAN FAMILY INSURANCE; ANDY REPPOND; BEAR RIVER 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COJ\1PANY; CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYDS; FARM 
BUREAU PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE CO:MPANY; FIRE INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE; FLINT ENERGY SERVICES, INC.; GREAT ANIERICAN INSURANCE 
COMPANY; JESUS OLIVERA; LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY; 
NATIONAL AMERICAN INSURANCE; PEERLESS INDEMNITY INSURANCE 
COMPANY; SENTINEL lNSURANCE COMPANY; SNELSON COMPANIES, INC.; ST. 
PAUL MERCURY INSURANCE COMPANY; TODD DEETZ D/B/A TODD DEETZ ENT; 
WEATHERFORD U.S., LP; WESTERN NATIONAL ASSURANCE COMPANY; FACTORY 
MUTIJAL INSURANCE COMPANY; CRAIG'S ROUSTABOUT SERVICE, INC.; NABORS 
COMPLETION AND PRODUCTION SERVICES CO.; DALBO-RN! HOLDINGS, INC.; and 
KENWORTH SALES COJv.fP ANY. ("Plaintiffs") are informed and believe, and thereon allege 
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. This action arises out of a fire and/or explosion ("Explosion") that occurred on or 
about March 2, 2013 at 4907 South 4625 East, Vernal, Utah, 84078 ("Premises"). 
2. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and venue is proper in this Court 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78B-3-307. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS· 
3. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiffs were, and are, persons who sustained 
damages and/or injury as a result of the Explosion or the insurance companies of persons who 
sustained damage and/or injury as a result of the Explosion. Plaintiffs include business who, at 
all times relevant, were and are authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah 
and insurance companies authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah as an 
insurance carrier and who provided insurance benefits to their insureds for damages caused them 
by the Explosion. The individual Plaintiffs are as follows: 
l..EGAL\22273547\l 
LEGAL\22281258\l 
a. Jesus Olivera 
b. Andy Reppond 
c. Todd Deetz 
d. Weatherford U.S., LP 
e. Nabors Completion and Production Services, Co. 
f. Craig's Roustabout Services, Inc. 
g. Dalbo-RNI Holdings, Inc. 
h. Kenworth Sales Company 
- 3 -
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4. At all times herein mentioned, ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. was, and is, a 
corporation authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah. 
5. At all times herein mentioned, CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, INC. was, 
and is, a corporation authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah. 
6. DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, are sued herein by their fictitious names. Plaintiffs 
believe that such DOE defendants are responsible, in whole or part, for the incident and damage 
hereinafter alleged. P}aintiffs will amend this Complaint to properly identify such defendants 
once their identities become known to Plaintiffs. 
7. Plaintiffs are inf01med and believe and thereon allege that, at all times herein 
mentioned, each of the defendants were the agent, servant, representative, or employee of each of 
the remaining defendants, and were at all times acting within the purpose and scope of said 
agencies, service or employment with the consent, permission or approval of each of their co-
defendants in committing the acts and omissions herein alleged. 
8. On or about March 2, 2013 the Explosion occurred on Defendant ADLER HOT 
OIL SERVICE, INC.'s premises at 4907 South 4625 East, Vernal, Utah, 84078. 
9. The Explosion caused bodily injury (''Subject Injury") or damaged real and 
personal property ("Subject Property") belonging to Plaintiffs and/or insured by Plaintiffs 
("Subject Losses"), in amounts to be proved at trial 
10. At the time of the Subject Losses, there were in effect insurance policies issued by 
the insurance company Plaintiffs to their respective insureds which insured against losses of the 
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11. Stubbs Oil Company, Inc. w~s insured by St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company. 
Stubbs Oil Company, Inc. suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for 
some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged. 
12. Chapman Construction was insured by AGCS Marine Insurance Company. 
Chapman Construction suffered damages to real and personal property, and ·was insured for 
some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged. 
13. Matt Betts !rucldng, Inc., was insured by Western National Assurance Company. 
Matt Betts Trucking, Inc., suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for 
some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged. 
14. William and Linda Milholland were insured by Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company. William and Linda Milholland suffered damages to real and personal property, and 
was insured for some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged. 
15. Travis Johnson was insured by Allstate Insurance Company. Travis Johnson 
suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for some, but not all, personal 
and real property lost or damaged. 
16.. Split Mountain Travel Plaza, Inc., was insured by Peerless Indemnity Insurance 
Company, suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for some, but not all, 
personal and real property lost or damaged. 
17. Warren Equipment Company was insured by Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance. 
Warren Equipment Company suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured 
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18. Todd Deetz d/b/a Deetz Ent (Enterprises) was insured by Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyds. Todd Deetz suffered damages to personal property, and was insur~d for some, but not 
all, personal property lost or damaged. 
19. Snelson Companies, Inc. suffered damages to real and personal prope1ty, and was 
insured for some, but not all, personal and real prope1ty lost or damaged. 
20. ~MM Realty of Utah, LLC was insured by Sentinel Insurance Company. EMM 
Realty of Utah, LLC suffered damages to real and personal prope1ty, and was insured for some, 
but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged. 
21. EMM Realty of Utah, LLC was also insured by Factory Mutual Insurance 
Company. EMM Realty of Utah, LLC suffered dam.ages to real and personal property, and was 
insured for some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged. 
22. Flint Energy Services Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its p1incipal place of 
business in Houston, Texas. Plaintiff Flint Energy Services Inc. was uninsured. Plaintiff Flint 
Energy Services Inc. suffered damages to business property, and was uninsured for all business 
property lost or damaged. 
23. Andy Reppond is an individual residing in Maiion, Union Parish, State of 
Louisiana. Andy Reppond was uninsured. Andy Reppond suffered damages to his business . 
property and personal prope1ty, and was uninsured for all business and personal property lost or 
damaged. 
24. Weatherford U.S., LP is a llinited partnership organized and existing under the 
laws of the State of Louisiana, and is authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of 
Utah. Weatherford U.S., LP suffered damages to real and personal property, and was uninsured 
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25. DM Brown Construction was insured by Farm Bureau Property & Casualty 
Insurance Company. DM Brown Construction suffered damages to real and personal property, 
and was insured for some, but not all, personal ·and real property lost or damaged. 
26. Marcia Luck was insured by Farm Bureau Prope1ty & Casualty Insurance 
Company. Marcia Luck suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for 
some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged. 
27. Loren S. Richins was i~sured by Frum Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance 
Company. Loren S. Richins suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insmed for 
some, but not all, personal and real prope1ty lost or damaged. 
28. Maralee Richens was insured by Fire Insurance Exchange. Maralee Richens 
suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for some, but no~ all, personal 
and real property lost or damaged. 
29. National Oilwell Varco was insured by Factory Mutual Insurance Company. 
National Oilwell Varco suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for 
some, but not all, personal and real property lost or damaged. 
30. Brady Trucking was insured by Great Americm1 Insurance Company. Brady 
Trucking suffered damages to real and personal property) and was insured for some, but not all, 
personal and real property lost or damaged: 
31. Aztec Well Servicing was insured by National American Insurance. Aztec Well 
Servicing suffered damages to real and personal property, and was insured for some, but not all, 
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32. Marsha and Ten-y Dugan were insured by American Family Insurance. Marsha 
and Ten-y Dugan suffered damages to real and personal property, and were insured for some, but 
not all, personal and real property lost or damaged. 
33. Nabors Completion and Production Services, Co., is a corporation>organized ana 
existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, and is authorized to conduct and transact 
business in the State of Utah. Nabors Completion and Production Services, Co. suffered 
damages to real and personal property, as well as business intenuption and loss of revenue. 
34. Craig's Roustabout Services, Inc., is a corporation organized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah, and is authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of 
Utah. Craig's Roustabout Services, Inc. suffered damages to real and personal property, as well 
as business interruption and loss of revenue. 
35. Dalbo-RNI Holdings, Inc., is-a corporation organized and existing under the laws 
of the State of Delaware; and is authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah. 
Dalbo-RNI Holdings, Inc. suffered damages to personal and business property, as well as 
business interruption and loss of revenue. 
36. Kenworth Sales Company is a corporation organized and existing under the laws 
of the State of Utah, and is authorized to conduct and transact business in the State of Utah. 
Kenworth Sales Company suffered damages to real and personal property, as well as business 
intem1ption and loss of revenue. 
37. Pursuant to the terms of the aforementioned insurance policies and claims for 
benefits filed thereunder by Plaintiffs' insured parties, the insurance company Plaintiffs paid to 
their respective insureds amounts exceeding one millior:i dollars ($1,000,000), amounts to be 
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38. Pursuant to the terms of the aforementioned insurance policy, equity, and by 
operation of law, the insurance company Plaintiffs are subrogated to the rights of their insured 
parties to ~e amounts paid as a result of the losses, in amounts to be proven at tdal. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Negligence Against Defendants ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC.; CHANDLER 
l\tIANUFACTURING, INC.; and DOES 1 through SO, Inclusive) 
39. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 12 as though 
fu 11 y set forth herein. 
40. Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. heats and pumps fluids at high 
pressure to circulate and clean oil and gas processing equipment. Services include pumping fluid 
down well bores, treating weU bores with chemicals, and maintaining hot oiling rods, tubing, and 
flow lines. 
41. CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, INC. manufactures oilfield equipment. 
42. At the time of the explosion, Defendant ADLER HOT OlL SERVICE, INC. 
leased or owned and was operating a truck manufactured by CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, 
INC. ("Subject Vehicle"). The Subject Vehicle was mounted with propane tanks. 
43. Defendants ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. and CHANDIER 
MANUFACTURING, INC. were under a duty of care to exercise due and reasonable care and 
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44. Defendants ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. and CHANDLER 
MANUFACTURING, INC. breached the aforementioned duty ~ough one or more of the 
following_ acts and/or omissions: 
a. carelessly and negligently failing to maintain the Subject Vehicle, in 
violation of the Utah Code including but not limited to U.C.A. § 41-6a- 1601 such that it had a 
dangerous propensity to ignite a fire and/or cause an explosion; 
b. carelessly and negligently servicing the Subject Vehk1e such that it had a 
dangerous propensity to ignite a frre and/or cause an explosion; 
C. carelessly and negligently performing repair work on the Subject Vehicle 
such that it had a dangerous propensity to ignite a fire and/or cause an explosion; 
d. carelessly and negligently inspecting the Subject Vehicle such that it had a 
dangerous propensity to ignite a fire and/or cause an explosion; 
e. carelessly and negligently operating the Subject Vehicle and its propane 
tanks such that it had a dangerous propensity to ignite a fire and/or cause an explosion; and 
f. were otherwise careless and negligent in acting or failing to act. 
45. Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. negligently filled the propane 
tanks to their capacity or beyond in the cold outside environment and then moved them into a 
heated garage for overnight storage. 
46. Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. knew or should have known that 
the difference between the ·outside temperature and the temperature in the garage would cause 
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47. Defendant CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, INC. sold or leased the Subject 
Vehicle to Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. 
48. Defendant CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, lNC. knew or should have known 
that the Subject Vehicle's manufacture and/or design would cause propane gas to leak if used in 
the foreseeable manner Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. used it. 
49. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned negligent acts or omissions 
to act, the Explosion occuned causing the damage and injury alleged herein. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Strict Liability - Abnormally Dangerous Activity Against Defendant 
ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. and DOES 1 through SO, Inclusive) 
50. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 23 as though 
fully set forth herein. 
51. Defendant's activities in operating, controlling, managing, and/or maintaining the 
Subject Vehicle constituted an abnonnally dangerous activity. 
52. Defendant's activities posed a high degree of risk of some harm to the Subject 
Property. Defendant filled two propane tanks to capacity or beyond while outside in cold 
temperatures, sealed them, and moved and left them in a heated garage. Because propane gas is 
highly flammable and is known to expand in warm temperatures, Defendant's activities posed a 
high degree of risk of harm to neighboring persons and property, including Plaintiffs. 
53. It was likely that any. harm caused by Defendant's activities would be great 
because Defendant's activities increased the likelihood that a fire or explosion would occur and 
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Defendant left the propane tanks unattended for the night, undoubtedly delaying response time in 
the case of fire or an explosion and thereby increasing the likelihood of severe damage. 
54. Defendant's activities were such that Defendant could not eliminate the risk 
through the exercise of reasonable care. Defendant's method of filling propane tanks to their 
capacity or beyond and leaving them in a heated garage unattended is characterized by an 
inability to eliminate the risk of great haim by the exercise of reasonable care. 
55. Defendant's activity is not one of common usage because it is_ not customarily 
carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people in the community. Both Defendant_'s 
business services and specific method of filling and stming flammable propane gas are 
uncommon. 
56. Defendant's activities on March 2, 2013 were inappropriate considering the place 
they were carried out. Defendant parked the truck with the propane tanks in a garage near 
residences. In fact, after the explosion and ensuing fire, law enforcement had to evacuate 
residents living within a half-mile of the site. 
57. The dangerous attributes of Defendant's activities outweigh the value of 
Defendant's activities to the community". The risk of explosion and fire caused by Defendanf s 
practices outweigh the value of clean oil and gas processing equipment because the risk is to not 
only property, but people's lives. In November 2010, there was a similar explosion an~ fire at the 
same building. The blast injured two people and caused two million dollars in property damage. 
58. Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs' insureds were damaged by the fire and/or explosion 
which was a direct result of Defendant's abnonnally dangerous activities in operating and 
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59. Plaintiffs' damages were the type of harm that would be anticipated as a result of 
the risk created by Defendant's abnormally dangerous activities. Specifically, the Explosion was 
the type of harm that would be anticipated as a result ot' leaking propane gas. 
60. Defendant's abnormally dangerous activity resulted in an explosion and fire and 
was a substantial factor in causing damage and destruction alleged herein, in amounts to be 
proved at trial. 
TIDRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Private Nuisance Against Defendant ADLER HOT OIL 
SERVICE, INC. and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive) 
61. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 34 as though 
fully set forth herein. 
62. Defendanf s activities in operating, controlling, managing, and/or maintaining the 
Subject Vehicle constituted a private nuisance. 
63. Defendant's activities caused a substantial and unreasonable inte1ference with the 
private use and enjoyment of the property of Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs' insureds. 
64. Defendant's activities posed significant risk of great harm to the Subject Property. 
The activities posed a significant risk of explosion and fire, which would likely greatly damage 
any surrounding property. 
65. Defendant's activities ultimately caused great damage to the Subject Property, 
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Plaintiffs' of Plaintiffs' insured parties were required to relocate their homes and businesses, and 
repair portions of the Subject Property. 
66. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts or omissions to act, 
the Explosion took place resulting in damages alleged herein, in amounts to be proved at trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Trespass Against Defendant ADLER HOT OIL SERVICE, INC. 
and DOES 1 through SO, Inclusive) 
67. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 40 as though 
fully set forth herein. 
68. Defendant trespassed on the Subject Property. 
69. Defenda!lt entered and remained on the Subject Property when Defendant caused 
shock waves from the Explosion to enter and permanently damage the Subject Property. 
70. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned acts or omissions to act, 
portions of the Subject Property suffered the damages and injury alleged herein, in amounts to 
be proven at trial. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Strict Product Liability for Manufacturing or Design Defect Against Defendant 
CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, INC. and DOES l through SO, Inclusive) 
71. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 45 as though 
fully set forth herein. 
72. Defendant designed and manufactured the Subject Vehicle. 
73. The Subject Vehicle had design and/or manufacturing defects that made the 
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74. The manufacture and/or design of the Subject Vehicle made it more likely that 
propane gas would 1eak out from the propane tanks. Allowing the tanks to be stored on top of 
one another allowed the lower tank to be overfilled. The liquid level gauge was difficult to see, 
as it was located on top of the upper tank. The tanks were designed to be filled beyond the level 
established by applicable laws, codes, and government and industry standards. 
75. The defect(s) were present at the time Defendant manufactured, sold, or 
distributed the Subject Vehicle. 
76. The defect(s) were causes of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages. 
77. As a direct and proximate result of the defects, the injury and damages alleged 
herein took place in amounts to be proven at trial. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Negligent Product Liability for Manufacturing or Design Defect Against Defendant 
CHANDLER MANUFACTURING, INC. and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive) 
78. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 52 as though 
fully set forth herein. 
79. Defendant designed and manufactured the Subject Vehicle. 
80. The Subject Vehicle had a design and/or manufacturing defect that made the 
product unreasonably dangerous. 
81. · The defect(s) were the result of Defendant's failure to use reasonable care. 
82. The manufacture and/or design of the Subject Vehicle made it more likely that 
propane gas would leak out from the propane tanks. Allowing the tanks to be stored on top of 
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as it was located on top of the upper tank. The tanks were designed to be filled beyond the level 
established by applicable laws, codes, and government and industry standards. 
83. The defect(s) were present at the time Defendant manufactured; sold, or 
distributed the Subject Vehicle. 
84. The defect(s) were causes of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages. · 
85. As a direct and proximate result of the defects, the Explosion occurred causing the 
injury and damages alleged herein, in amounts to be proven at trial. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Strict Product Liability for Failure to Warn Against Defendant CHANDLER 
MANUFACTURING, INC. and DOES 1 through SO, Inclusive) 
86. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 60 as· though 
fully set forth herein. 
87. Defendant had a duty to warn about a danger from the Subject Vehicle's 
foreseeable use of which Defendant knew or reasonably should have known and that a 
reasonable user would not expect. 
88. Defendant failed to provide an adequate warning at the time the product was 
manufactured, distributed, or sold. Defendant did not supply instructions or warrungs for filling 
the tanks. Defendants did not supply instructions or warnings for filling the tanks in cold 
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90. The lack of an adequate warning was a cause of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages. 
91. It was foreseeable that one would fill the tanks to capacity because the design and 
manufacture of the Subject Vehicle allowed them to be filled to capacity. 
92. A reasonable user would not expect the Subject Vehicle to leak propane gas and 
cause an explosion. 
93. As a direct and proximate result of the failure to warn, the Explosion took place 
causing the injury and damages alleged. herein in amounts to be proved at trial. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(For Negligent Product Liability for Failure to Warn Against Defendant CHANDLER 
MANUFACTURING, INC. and DOES 1 through 50, Inclusive) 
94. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate by reference allegations 1 through 68 as though 
fully set forth herein. 
95. Defendant had a duty to warn about a danger from the Subject Vehicle's 
foreseeable -use of which Defendant knew or reasonably should have known and that a 
reasonable user would not expect. 
96. Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care because he failed to provide an 
adequate warning at the time the product was manufactured, distributed, or sold. Defendant did 
not supply instructions for filling the tanks .. Defendants did not supply instructions or warnings 
for filling the tanks in cold conditions and then moving the tanks into a warmer environment. 





Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
98. The lack of an adequate warning was a cause of Plaintiffs' injuries and damages. 
99. It was foreseeable that one would fill the tanks to capacity because the design and 
manufacture of the Subject Vehicle allowed them to be filled to capacity. 
100. A reasonable user would not expect the Subject Vehicle to leak propane gas an~ 
cause an explosion. 
101. As a direct and proximate result of the failure to warn, the Explosion occurred 
resulting in the injury and damages alleged herein in amounts to be proved at trial. 
JURY DEMAND and PRAYER 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38, Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants and each of them as 
follows: 
1. For compensatory damages in an amount to b~ proven at trial; 
2 For prejudgment interest, costs and attorney's fees as pennitted by law; and 
3. For such other relief as the Court may deem just and fair. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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AGCS Marine Insurance Company, et al. v. Adler Hot Oil Service, Inc., et al. 
Exhibit 1 to Amended Complaint 
Kenneth W. Maxwell (#6609) 
BAUMAN LOEWE WITT & MAXWELL, PLLC 
8765 E. Bell Road, Suite 210 
Scottsdale, AZ 85260 
Telephone: 480-502-4664 
Facsimile: 480-502-477"4 
k.max well @blwmlawfinn.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Certain Underwriters at Lloyds; Fire Insurance Exchange; Sentinel 
Insurance Company 
Mark D. Taylor (#9533) 
LEWIS HANSEN 
The Judge Building, Suite 410 
Eight East Broadway 




Attorneys for Plaintiffs Great American Insurance Company; Jesus Olivera; Snelson Companies, 
Inc. 
TrentJ. Waddoups 
CARR & WADDOUPS 
609 Judge Building 
8 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: 801-363-0888 
Facsimile: 801-3 63-8512 
trent@cw-law.net 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Farm Bureau Property & Casualty Insurance Company 
Gretchen H. Johns 
902 East Hwy 40, Suite 216 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Telephone: 949-413-0338 
gretchenjobns.law@gmail.com 
Attorney for Plaintiffs Andy Reppond and Flint Energy Services, Inc. 
David Reay 
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MILLER, REAY & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
43 West 9000 South, Suite B 




Attorneys for Plaintiff Todd J?eetz, d/b/a Todd Deetz Enterp1ises 
Ryan R. Jibson 
HOLLAND & HART, LLP 
222 South Main Street, Suite 2200 




Attorneys for Weatherford U.S., LP 
Harrison Colter 
COLIER JENNINGS 
333 South 520 West, Suite 350 
Lindon, UT 8404 2 
Telephone: 801-932-6162 
harrison @col terj ennings. com 
Attorneys for St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company 
Terry M. Plant #2160 
Jeremy M. Seeley #12653 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
Facsimile: (801) 531-9747 
~mail: tplant@pckutah.com 
jseeley@pckutah.com 
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Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. faery action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An 
executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an-·express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's name without 
joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so pro~des, an action for the use or 
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it 
is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for 
ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such 
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall ha\e the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of 
the real party in interest. 
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. An unemancipated minor or an insane or incompetent person who is a 
party must appear either by a general guardian or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court 
in which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in 
which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the 
action or proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may ha\€ a general guardian and may ha\e appeared by the 
guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who 
might be a minor or an incompetent person. 
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by a court must be appointed as 
follows: 
(c)(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if the minor is of the age of fourteen 
years, or if under that age, upon the application of a relati\e or mend of the minor . 
. (c)(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if the minor is of the age of fourteen 
years and applies within 21 days after the seNce of the summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so 
to apply, then upon the application of a relati\e or friehd of the minor, or of any other party to the action. 
(c)(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon motion therefor, shall be entitled to 
an order designating some suitable person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant 
or someone in behalf of the defendant within 21 days after seNce of notice of such motion shall cause to be 
appointed a guardian for such minor. SeNce of such notice may be made upon the defendant's general or 
testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is none, such notice, together with the summons 
in the action, shall be sel\ed in the manner pro~ded for publication of summons upon such minor, if o\er fourteen 
years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such seNce on the person with whom the minor resides. The 
guardian ad litem for such nonresident minor defendant shall ha\€ 21 days after appointment in which to plead to 
the action. 
(c)(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or proceeding, upon the application of a 
relatiw or friend of such insane or incompetent person, or of any other pa~y to the action or proceeding. 
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or more persons associated in any 
business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other association, not a corporation, transact such 
business under a common name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they may sue or be 
sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint property of all the 
associates in the same manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint liability. The 
separate property of an indi'v1dual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the member 
is named as a party and the court acquires jurisdiction o\€r the member. 
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a nonresident person is associated in 
and conducts business within the state of Utah in one or more places in that person's own name or a common trade 
name, and the business is conducted under the_super'\Asion of a manager, superintendent or agent the person may 
be sued in the person's name in any action arising out of the conduct of the business. 
(f) As u~ed in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitio.ner, and the term defendant shall include a 
res pendent. 
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